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COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 
More far-reaching measures to tackle VAT fraud 
1.  BACKGROUND 
The Commission’s Communication on fiscal fraud of 31 May 2006
1 raised the idea 
of changes in the current Value Added Tax (VAT) system as a possible option to 
tackle currently experienced VAT fraud, either via a generalised reverse-charge 
system, where liability for VAT payments would be shifted from the supplier to the 
purchaser, or by taxing intra-Community supplies of goods
2. The ECOFIN Councils 
of 7 June 2006 and 28 November 2006 welcomed the Communication and started 
examining these two options. 
The ECOFIN Council of 5 June 2007 expressed the view that the preferred system of 
taxing intra-Community supplies should be based on taxation in the Member State of 
departure and not in the Member State of arrival, and invited the Commission to 
continue examination of this system as regards the required clearing procedure 
between Member States. The Council noted also that a majority of Member States 
expressed reservations about an optional generalised reverse-charge mechanism but 
called on the Commission to analyse the potential effects of such a system and to 
examine the possibility of a pilot project in a Member State. 
The purpose of this working document is to provide an analysis of the taxation of 
intra-Community supplies and the optional reverse-charge system. 
2.  TAXATION OF INTRA-COMMUNITY SUPPLIES OF GOODS IN THE MEMBER STATE OF 
DEPARTURE 
2.1.  Methodology 
Following the Council request, the basic elements of such a system were examined 
and developed on the basis of Member States’ replies to a questionnaire from the 
Commission and by the Commission’s own analysis. In this context, the (bilateral) 
clearing mechanism was considered to be the most essential element. The results 
should allow a political decision to be taken on the usefulness of carrying out further 
in-depth and detailed analysis and design of the other, more detailed, aspects of the 
system (e.g. choices to be made as regards simplification for triangular supplies, 
transfer of goods, special schemes, etc.). 
                                                 
1 COM(2006)  254. 
2  For the Communication on conventional fraud measures, reference is made to COM(2007) 758.  
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2.2.  Basic concepts of the system 
2.2.1.  General 
The system of taxation of intra-Community supplies in the Member State of 
departure is based on the following assumptions for the purposes of this working 
document: 
•  The current system would generally remain applicable except where specified 
differently below. 
•  A taxable person making an intra-Community supply
3 must charge, at a common 
rate of 15%, VAT to his customer who is a taxable person or a non-taxable person 
acting as such in another Member State. 
•  As a general rule, no VAT would be due after transport or dispatch of the goods to 
the Member State of arrival; equivalent to an intra-Community acquisition. 
•  However, in order to guarantee the neutrality of the system the purchaser would 
declare, in cases where he is not entitled to deduct the VAT in full, an intra-
Community acquisition in the Member State of arrival and account for the VAT 
difference that might occur, either positive or negative, between the rate of 15% 
charged on the operation and the domestic rate applicable in that Member State. 
•  The purchaser would be entitled to deduct the VAT he has paid to his supplier and 
the VAT he has accounted for because of the rate difference via the VAT return 
and according to the right-of-deduction rules of the Member State of arrival. The 
purchaser would, under all circumstances, need to have an invoice from the 
supplier before being allowed to exercise his right of deduction
4. 
•  Since VAT would be paid in the Member State of supply and deducted in another 
Member State, linking supply and acquisition listings would become even more 
important in order to respond to the inherent risk of deduction without a 
corresponding payment. As a further step, and in order to minimise the number of 
mismatches between these listings, it could be an option to change the rules 
governing the time the tax becomes chargeable
5, and to link it entirely to the 
issuing of the invoice insofar as the VAT becomes due in any case if an invoice 
has not been issued within a certain period. 
•  VAT receipts in respect of the intra-Community supply and the subsequent 
acquisition should accrue to the Member State where the intra-Community 
acquisition has taken place. Even when the recipient is not entitled to deduct the 
VAT in full, the amount remitted from the Member State of supply to the Member 
State of arrival would always be the 15% VAT charged on the intra-Community 
                                                 
3  For the purposes of this Communication, ‘intra-Community supply’ is a supply which is currently 
exempt under Article 138(1) of VAT Directive 2006/112/EC. 
4  See also Article 178(c) of VAT Directive 2006/112/EC. 
5  See Articles 67 and 69 of VAT Directive 2006/112/EC on the chargeability of the VAT in relation to, 
respectively, intra-Community supplies and intra-Community acquisitions.  
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supply. Any VAT gain from a taxable person not having a full right of deduction 
would accrue to the Member State of arrival. 
•  These principles require a clearing mechanism between Member States in order to 
ensure that the VAT receipts accrue to the Member State where the intra-
Community acquisition has taken place. 
2.2.2.  Clearing procedure 
A taxable person making an intra-Community supply will charge 15% VAT on the 
consideration to a taxable person in another Member State. The taxable person in the 
Member State of supply will declare the VAT on his domestic VAT return and pay 
the amount due to his tax authority. This VAT needs to be remitted to the Member 
State of intra-Community acquisition from the Member State of supply. 
Since intra-Community supplies would be taxed, every Member State of supply will 
have to remit VAT to the Member States of intra-Community acquisition. At the 
same time, the Member State of supply will also receive VAT from other Member 
States in relation to intra-Community acquisitions made in its territory. 
It is envisaged that the clearing system would be bilateral between Member States 
based on microeconomic data collected at an individual level from taxable persons in 
the Member State of departure and the Member State of arrival of the goods. In this 
context there are three possibilities for collection of this data: 
•  By means of the normal VAT declaration. 
•  By means of a monthly recapitulative statement with global amounts per 
customer/supplier. 
•  By means of a monthly recapitulative statement at invoice level by suppliers and 
purchasers. 
It seems sensible to build upon the existing information obligations. For this reason, 
the second and third options are preferred over the first option. 
In the Commission’s view, the second option appears on balance more advantageous 
than the third option. Option two builds on the current concept regarding the taxable 
person making intra-Community supplies. Given the Commission’s intention to 
make a proposal for monthly recapitulative statements, following Member States’ 
general support in the Anti Tax Fraud Strategy (ATFS) working group, the reporting 
obligations for suppliers may not need any further change. 
Option two would require, of course, that a taxable person making acquisitions 
would also be obliged to submit monthly recapitulative statements. The cost of these 
changes is detailed in section 2.6.1. 
Whilst the third option would provide most detailed information for Member States, 
it is difficult to imagine how they would deal with the volume of data they would 
receive (and follow up mismatches, including those stemming from currency 
exchange calculations). Moreover, it would be likely to impose disproportionate  
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burdens on taxable persons doing business in the Single Market as making intra-
Community supplies/acquisitions would become significantly more burdensome than 
making domestic supplies/purchases. 
A study by the consultant looked at the cost to businesses of a requirement to record 
information on the recapitulative statement at invoice level instead of on a company-
to-company basis. An average one-off fixed cost of €62 000 and an average annual 
recurring cost of €2 250 was calculated. Unfortunately, this can not be extrapolated 
(due to the small sample involved) to determine an estimated total EU cost. 
2.3.  The effects of taxing intra-Community supplies 
In the first place such an approach ensures a higher level of equal treatment between 
intra-Community and domestic supplies. However, there will be no full parallelism 
as the rates applicable will differ, although to a much a lower extent than today. 
Moreover, the current risks for the supplier of an intra-Community supply to exempt 
such supply, where the conditions for the exemption are not fulfilled, would 
diminish, as his risk regarding an (unforeseen) VAT payment, arising from the 
supply made, would be limited to the potential difference between the common rate 
of 15% and the rate applicable to his domestic supplies. 
2.4.  Risks of new fraud, and efficiency in eliminating existing fraudulent activities 
A study carried out by an external consultant forms the basis for evaluating fraud 
risks from introduction of taxation of intra-Community supplies. 
(1)  New risks of fraud 
The study presents two main forms of fraud likely to result from taxation of intra-
Community supplies. Firstly, the Member State of acquisition allows the taxable 
person a right of deduction without the supplier paying over the VAT to the Member 
State of supply. Secondly, a taxable person creates an artificial refund position using 
a taxed intra-Community supply, more likely in combination with a third-country 
export. These frauds could involve false intra-Community invoices. 
These types of fraud are facilitated by the fact that payment of the VAT is made in 
one Member State and the deduction is allowed in another Member State. As the 
study points out “this might enhance the risk of deduction without an underlying 
payment”. If combined with a deferred payment scheme for imports, where the VAT 
is charged and deducted at the same time on the VAT return, the likelihood of VAT 
not remitted on a subsequent taxed intra-Community supply is increased. 
In addition, the study states that rate differentials might be exploited for fraudulent 
purposes. For instance, a domestic zero-rated supply is changed to a taxed intra-
Community supply at 15% which, when followed by a domestic zero-rated supply of 
the same goods, would create a false right to a VAT refund. Also, taxable persons 
without a full right of deduction may exploit rate differentials between the domestic 
VAT rate and that of taxed intra-Community supplies. 
To counter these possible frauds, the report suggests that a reporting system for intra-
Community supplies and purchases is put in place. This should be accompanied by  
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improved control measures on the part of the tax authorities, better cooperation 
between Member States in exchanging information and improved controls in respect 
of third-country exports. 
(2)  Elimination of existing fraudulent activities 
The elimination of all existing fraudulent activities is not the aim of taxing intra-
Community supplies. Taxing intra-Community supplies will not tackle VAT loss 
through the black economy, contrived insolvencies or other domestic VAT frauds 
that currently exist. 
Rather, the measure aims to target the specific fraud known as missing trader intra-
Community (MTIC) fraud. It aims to do this by ending the current exemption for 
intra-Community supplies which allows continual VAT repayments for the circular 
flow of goods in and out of a Member State for which VAT is uncollected at a 
previous stage. 
The study does not address whether taxing intra-Community supplies effectively 
eliminates the existing MTIC fraud, but whether new forms of fraud would arise. In 
this respect, though, the study does identify a mutation of MTIC fraud from intra-
Community supplies to third-country exports. 
Under the present MTIC fraud, a taxable person effecting intra-Community 
acquisitions goes missing without paying over the VAT he received from his 
customer on his onward domestic supplies. This is followed by an exempt intra-
Community supply by that customer providing him with a repayment of the VAT 
paid to his supplier. Under the mutated fraud, a VAT refund because of exempt intra-
Community supplies would be replaced by a VAT refund as a result of third-country 
exports. The overall effect is, however, the same with a request for a refund of 
uncollected VAT at a previous stage. 
However, the study states that this type of third-country MTIC fraud is likely to 
occur but only for a limited period of time, in fact on a one-off basis. The difficulty 
for fraudsters is the declaration requirements for third-country imports and exports 
and the enhanced customs controls. The advantages afforded to businesses with the 
free movement of goods in the EU, and simplified reporting obligations, is absent in 
respect of third countries. 
Furthermore, the study states that MTIC fraud could remain by exploiting rate 
differentials. Whilst the fraud gain would be less, it could nevertheless remain 
significant. Those Member States with a high domestic rate, for instance Denmark 
and Sweden with a standard rate of 25%, could remain susceptible. In effect, the 
taxable person making an intra-Community supply at a 15% VAT rate, yet 
purchasing the goods at a domestic VAT rate of 25%, would be entitled to a VAT 
refund of 10% of the value of the goods. The domestic supplier, having purchased 
the goods via an intra-Community supply, would not remit the equivalent VAT to the 
tax authorities.  
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2.4.1.  Conclusion 
The Commission believes that the taxation of intra-Community supplies would 
significantly reduce the attractiveness of MTIC fraud in that fraudsters could only 
profit from a differential between 15% and the standard VAT rate. This would 
probably mean that fraudsters would have to concentrate their efforts on those 
Member States with high standard rates and would be easier to identify. 
The taxation of intra-Community supplies would however not solve existing 
domestic VAT fraud and may even add to the magnitude of such fraud. 
2.5.  Competitive aspects 
A founding principle of the VAT Directive is to promote effective removal of the 
restrictions on the movement of goods between Member States. The common VAT 
regime should be neutral as regards the origin of goods and their stage of production 
or distribution, so that a common market, permitting fair competition and resembling 
a real internal market, may be achieved. This is of particular importance when the 
level of intra-Community trade is considered. With over two and a half million 
businesses across the EU making intra-Community purchases of over €2 400 billion
6, 
it is important that this level of trade is not significantly disrupted or hampered by 
any new regime. The relative simplicity of the current scheme should not be 
discounted when comparing it to an alternative. In principle, a business which has a 
full right to deduct would be unaffected by the taxation of intra-Community trade, 
and would apply the same principle to intra-Community acquisitions as it does to 
domestic purchases, and pay the VAT due to its supplier and reclaim this as input tax 
on its VAT return. 
2.5.1.  Cash flow 
The main competitive aspects could therefore be assumed to only arise from possible 
cash-flow effects, which are exceedingly difficult to evaluate. In principle, the 
introduction of taxation would suggest that the overall amount of the value of intra-
Community exchange would in future have to be pre-financed at the common rate of 
15%. This would amount to some €360 billion of tax to be financed. 
Such a figure has, however, to be looked at in the context of a number of variables 
that can influence the overall cash-flow situation. 
These variables for businesses currently making intra-Community supplies and 
acquisitions and who would continue to do so were the system to be changed are: 
•  The credit terms allowed by creditors. 
•  The credit terms granted to debtors. 
•  The length of time taken by Member States to make VAT refunds. 
                                                 
6  Eurostat 2006 figure.  
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•  The length of time between the taxable event and the date on which the VAT 
becomes payable. 
(1)  Cash-flow issues arising from the relationships between businesses 
A taxable person making intra-Community supplies who does not grant credit terms 
to his customers will enjoy a cash-flow gain because his customer will pay him the 
VAT on the supplies immediately and that VAT does not have to be paid to the 
Treasury until the date the VAT becomes payable. 
On the other hand, a taxable person who allows credit terms will suffer a cash-flow 
loss if the length of the credit terms exceeds the difference between the time he 
allows his customer to pay him and the time his own Member State allows for the 
payment of the VAT. 
A taxable person making intra-Community acquisitions without credit terms from his 
suppliers will suffer a cash-flow loss because he will have to pre-finance the VAT on 
the goods which up to now had not been subject to VAT. 
A taxable person making intra-Community acquisitions with credit terms from his 
suppliers will have a cash-flow gain if the period allowed by his suppliers is greater 
than the period within which he is obliged to submit his VAT declaration. 
(2)  Cash-flow issues arising from the relationship between taxable persons and 
the administration 
A taxable person not granting credit terms and currently in a refund situation because 
he makes intra-Community supplies will have a cash-flow gain because he will 
receive the output VAT from his customers earlier than he would have received the 
refund on their inputs from his Member State. He would change from being a taxable 
person entitled to refunds to being a taxable person with liabilities to the Treasury. 
Such taxable persons who grant credit terms (but who do not receive credit terms 
from their suppliers) will suffer a cash-flow loss if the credit terms given exceed the 
length of time it takes for the Member State to make a VAT refund. This situation 
would also apply to taxable persons exporting goods where some of the goods have 
been acquired from taxable persons in other Member States, as the exporter would 
have a higher VAT deduction due to an increase in taxed acquisitions. 
Those Member States that make VAT refunds quickly would incur a cash-flow loss, 
at least in the first year of operation, as they would be allowing input credit to their 
taxable persons before they had received compensation via the clearing system from 
the Member State of the supplier. In those Member States in which VAT refunds 
currently take longer, businesses would experience a cash-flow advantage if the 
length of time taken to make refunds currently exceeds the credit terms allowed by 
suppliers. 
In conclusion, if there were no credit terms, or if credit terms were 15 days 
maximum, it is likely that sellers in intra-Community trade would profit from an 
overall cash-flow advantage whereas purchasers would suffer additional financial 
burdens. However, what is clear is that there will be an overall cash-flow loss which  
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would have to be financed. As it is more likely that stronger players in a market 
would maintain their profit margin, it would appear that any additional financing cost 
would find its way down to the consumer in terms of increased prices which would 
have the effect of increasing inflation, at least in the first year of operation. 
2.5.2.  Rate differentials from that of the common rate of 15% 
Competitive aspects may arise in Member States which have a number of reduced or 
zero rates. A business in a Member State which applies a reduced rate to a particular 
commodity may be reluctant to purchase from another Member State, with the need 
of having to pre-finance VAT at 15% rather than at the lower amount if purchased 
domestically. 
Similarly, in Member States that apply a rate higher than 15% to most goods, the rate 
of 15% may create an attraction to buy from another Member State rather than 
domestically. 
Both arguments appear to be correct in theory but to be rather irrelevant in practice. 
In fact, by that same logic the current system would — by exempting intra-
Community supplies from tax – lead to an incentive to buy in another Member State 
rather than domestically, and this scheme may well have contributed to economic 
integration even if transport has certainly offset some of the potential advantage. 
Basically, however, trade in goods is determined by specific needs and market 
requirements. The experiences gathered so far suggest that such rate differentials 
have no major competitive effects. 
2.5.3.  Conclusion 
The rate differentials will be reduced by comparison to the current situation for 
which no complaints have been formulated as to their competitive aspects. The 
Commission, therefore, does not consider this to be an important distorting element. 
The Commission is more concerned about potential cash-flow effects in so far as 
such effects could increase overall costs of intra-Community supplies. Such costs 
could be particularly harmful to small businesses’ opportunities to benefit from the 
Single Market. On the other hand, the Commission does not think that these effects 
need to be overstated as current pre-financing with substantial refund delays also 
causes substantial costs for such transactions, and to which small businesses are more 
exposed than larger businesses. 
2.6.  Estimate of additional costs for taxpayers and tax administrations 
The Commission did not have sufficient information at its disposal to be able to 
provide a rough estimate of the additional costs, either for taxpayers or the tax 
administrations, of a system of taxing intra-Community supplies. For this reason, a 
questionnaire was sent to Member States on 2 August 2007. 
That questionnaire focused on the costs of implementing taxation of intra-
Community supplies. This was split between information requested on taxpayers and 
information on tax administrations.  
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In addition, a study was commissioned to identify extra costs for monthly and more-
detailed recapitulative statements. These results are used here in relation to the 
additional costs on taxpayers. 
2.6.1.  Additional costs for taxpayers 
Three areas were identified that could impact on the costs for taxpayers in moving to 
a system of taxing intra-Community supplies. These were reporting obligations, 
possible removal of the simplification rules (Article 141 of the VAT Directive in 
relation to triangular supplies) and cash-flow effects. We will refer below only to the 
reporting obligations. 
A clearing system based on information at the microeconomic level, that is to say the 
level of businesses, would impose extra obligations for businesses both supplying 
goods to and purchasing goods from another Member State. In the view of the 
Commission, both would need to provide a monthly recapitulative statement 
covering supplies and acquisitions. Neither this mirror reporting nor its frequency 
is (yet) required under the current system, although a proposal aimed at the 
introduction of such changes is likely to be presented to the Council shortly. 
(a)  Taxpayers making taxed intra-Community supplies 
From the information received from the Member States replying to the questionnaire, 
it transpires that 4.3% of the 28 million taxable persons who submit VAT returns in 
the EU complete recapitulative statements today — that is 1.2 million taxable 
persons. Of these, less than 10% (114 796) submit recapitulative statements on a 
monthly basis. Thus, a new obligation for a monthly recapitulative statement would 
at most concern the remaining one million or so taxable persons (see table in Annex). 
The study provides some indication of the extra cost for businesses in this respect. 
Based on the standard cost model and using a sample of 10 large and SME 
businesses in Belgium, Denmark and Hungary, an average fixed cost of 
approximately €350 and an average recurring cost of €6 300
7 per annum would be 
the extra cost of imposing monthly recapitulative statements. Due to the small 
sample used, these cost figures cannot be extrapolated to determine an estimated total 
EU cost. Disregarding the inexplicably very high figure for the one large company, 
the overall average recurring cost would amount to some €1  300 per annum. 
Moreover, the rigidity of the electronic procedure put in place in certain Member 
States has had a considerable impact on the recurring cost, and the implementation of 
a more flexible procedure for the transmission of data would reduce this cost. 
(b)  Taxpayers receiving taxed intra-Community supplies 
About 9% (2.6m) of taxpayers make intra-Community acquisitions. Under the 
envisaged system of taxing intra-Community supplies they would be required to 
submit a monthly intra-Community acquisition listing at invoice level. 
                                                 
7  This average is affected by the small size of the sample and the fact that one large business estimated 
recurring costs at €56 000. For most of the other businesses (large and SME) the cost was estimated to 
be less than €4 000. The average cost for large businesses was €11 224 — again influenced by the very 
high figure of the one large business.  
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The additional cost for taxpayers of complying with this obligation could be assumed 
to be equivalent to the costs resulting from monthly recapitulative statements; since 
this will be a new information obligation rather than an adaptation of an existing 
obligation, the one-off fixed costs could be significantly higher — at least for those 
traders who are not at the same time making intra-Community supplies and 
acquisitions. 
2.6.2.  Additional costs for tax administrations 
In general the replies to the questionnaire in respect of the additional costs for tax 
administrations were poor. Out of the 27 Member States, only 23 replied to the 
questionnaire. Of the 23 Member States that replied, 17 Member States were unable 
to provide any figures on the extra costs for tax administrations. Thus, only six 
Member States provided some figures on the additional costs for the tax 
administration. 
Nevertheless, from the replies given, the costs to the tax administrations vary from 
about €300 000 for a small Member State to €2 500 000 for a large Member State. 
This is in relation to the costs for providing trader information, training of staff, 
recruitment of new staff, changes to the control system and adaptation of the IT 
structure. 
However, it would be inappropriate at this stage to draw any meaningful conclusions 
from these figures. They can at best be described as indicative. 
2.6.3.  Conclusion 
The concept of taxing intra-Community supplies in the country of supply calls for 
additional obligations on the taxable person making the intra-Community 
acquisition, in order to provide for the necessary input for microeconomic clearing. 
The Commission is convinced that it would not be necessary to have very detailed 
reporting, given that the concept of VAT control is marked by self-assessment with 
subsequent ex post control. It would therefore argue that an obligation of monthly 
global recapitulative statements for acquisitions and supplies should suffice. 
The information on the cost to tax administration is not sufficient for the 
Commission to be able to draw any conclusions. Such cost may also depend on 
further details to be specified regarding the functioning of the clearing system. 
2.7.  Impact of clearing on Member States’ budgets 
Those Member States in which the total amount of intra-Community supplies 
exceeds the total amount of intra-Community acquisitions could be considered to be 
“net contributors”. Similarly, those Member States where the amount of intra-
Community acquisitions exceeds the intra-Community supplies could be considered 
to be “net receivers”. In this context, “net contributors” would mean those Member 
States that have to pay more to other Member States than they would receive from 
other Member States; and vice versa for “net receivers”. 
On the basis of the trade statistics for 2006 (see Annex 5.1) it appears that 16 
Member States, under a system of taxed intra-Community supplies, would be “net  
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receivers”. Eleven Member States would be “net contributors”. This is, however, a 
rather limited view on the basis of aggregated figures. In reality, most Member States 
will be both “net receivers” and “net contributors” — depending on the individual 
bilateral trade balance between two respective Member States. 
This clearly means that in a clearing system any Member State becomes dependent 
on other Member States’ payments but, obviously, Member States that are overall 
“net receivers” will be even more dependent on other Member States. The levels of 
trade involved make it extremely important that Member States are committed to 
ensuring that the amounts are not only correctly collected, but are also passed on 
where necessary. Net receivers had a negative balance of just over €200bn in 2006, 
which means that they would be relying on other Member States to collect VAT of 
around €30bn for them. In addition, the largest net contributors, Germany and the 
Netherlands, would find that they would be required to collect and distribute a large 
proportion of the intra-Community VAT. 
The total amount of excess of acquisitions (imports) over supplies (exports) — the 
trade balance — was of the order of €80 billion in 2006. This discrepancy from what 
should in essence be zero (because intra-Community trade is within a closed market 
and one Member State’s deficit is another’s surplus) can be explained by a number of 
reasons. These include the level of estimation by Member States of non-submitted 
returns; the timing of the returns; errors on the returns; thresholds under which 
statements are not required; territorial issues; and the inclusion of goods for onward 
processing. Whilst this level of discrepancy may cause concern as an indication of 
the possible level of mismatches within the clearing system, nevertheless, for the 
majority of Member States the value of intra-Community supplies is between 10% 
and 20% of total supplies, meaning that 80% or more of current national VAT 
receipts would not be affected. 
To avoid any disruption of VAT collection in Member States, it would be necessary 
to organise continuous transfers between Member States that can either be 
preliminary settlements on the basis of the recapitulative statements or can take the 
form of advanced payments of agreed amounts based on trade balances in the past. 
At least once per year, however, a final balance should be agreed. 
2.8.  Allocation of responsibilities and risks between Member States 
Given an amount of €30 billion to be paid between Member States, the allocation of 
responsibilities and risks between the Member State of supply, where the tax is to be 
paid to the administration, and the Member State of intra-Community acquisition 
where, subsequently, tax is deducted, becomes essential. 
2.8.1.  Earlier work on a Clearing System 
In understanding the issues in how a Clearing System would work, thought should be 
given to previous work. In this regard, prior to the completion of the Single Market, 
the Commission issued a Communication (Com (87) 323 final/2) on 25 August 1987 
entitled “Completing the internal market — the introduction of a VAT clearing 
system for intra-Community supplies”. However, there are certain key differences 
between that proposal and what is being considered now.  
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The Clearing System as described in 1987 was based on taxable persons declaring 
the amount of VAT on intra-Community supplies and the amount of VAT deducted 
on intra-Community purchases. In effect it was stated that “each registered trader 
will simply fill in two extra boxes on his normal declaration indicating his output and 
input VAT on intra-Community trade as a whole.” Consequentially, VAT not 
deducted would accrue as a surplus to the Clearing System. Furthermore, a listing of 
individual traders’ activities was rejected as it was stated that this “provides neither 
an adequate nor a suitable form of control over the revenue flows involved in the 
Clearing System.” 
In the 1987 Communication on the Clearing System, the Commission was allocated 
certain tasks. Amongst these was the responsibility for the accounting and operation 
of the clearing mechanism and analysis of the data. This role was deemed necessary 
as Member States would establish their position in relation to intra-Community 
supplies and purchases and make a single payment or a request for refund from the 
Clearing System. In the new Clearing System, the clearing mechanism would be 
based on bilateral transfers between Member States and the role of the Commission 
in managing the system is not needed. 
Furthermore, unlike the earlier Clearing System, the new Clearing System is based 
on trader listings. Moreover, as the intra-Community supplies will have a uniform 
15% VAT rate, it is not based on VAT amounts but on the value of the transactions, 
allowing for a theoretical balance, rather than a surplus, in a Clearing System. 
The 1987 Communication did recognise the need for control measures as the VAT 
amounts involved were large and the risk of fraud and trader errors needed to be 
addressed. These measures included clearly defined audit requirements, intensified 
administrative cooperation, greater use of agreed sampling techniques and credibility 
checks, and central coordination. There was also mention of arbitration in case of 
disputes between Member States. These issues would need to be looked at again 
under a new Clearing System. 
Unfortunately, the 1987 paper did not provide sufficient detail on the control issues 
and indeed recognised that the level of detail would need to be “developed in the 
course of subsequent discussion”. 
So whilst the Clearing System proposed in 1987 is useful as guidance regarding 
certain recurring themes it is also sufficiently different to the extent that issues 
pertinent 20 years ago no longer have the same relevance. A point in question is 
trader listings, which since 1993 have been a common feature of recording intra-
Community transactions but which were disregarded back in 1987, although 
subsequent discussions did look more favourably on trader listings. 
Work on a Clearing System came to prominence again in 1996 when the 
Commission was working towards a definitive system of VAT based on the origin 
principle. For this a system of macroeconomic reallocation of VAT revenues was 
suggested. This, though, has little relevance since the Clearing System described in 
respect of taxing intra-Community supplies is based on a micromodel of trader 
declarations.  
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What should be emphasised, and indeed has remained a recurrent theme throughout, 
is the need for enhanced cooperation between Member States. Whatever the details 
of a Clearing System, and there have been many variants and suggestions over the 
years, a fundamental cornerstone to it working effectively is the cooperation between 
Member States. 
2.8.2.  Basic principle 
As a basic principle, it should be the responsibility of the tax administration of the 
Member State of supply to collect the VAT from its supplier and to make a transfer 
via the clearing system to the tax administration where the intra-Community 
acquisition has taken place. This is an important point as the purchaser has a right to 
deduct when the tax becomes chargeable. The system would become unworkable if 
the Member State of acquisition granting — in a correct way — the right of 
deduction, would not be able to rely on the Member State of supply to pay over the 
VAT, irrespective of whether the VAT due could be collected or not. Restricting the 
clearing system to VAT that has been collected would imply that all risks, which the 
Member State of deduction is unable to control or assess, would be transferred to that 
Member State. 
By way of example, a taxable person in Member State A would charge and collect 
VAT of 15% on an intra-Community supply to a taxable person in Member State B. 
The taxable person in Member State A declares the VAT on his domestic VAT 
return and pays the amount due to his tax authority. The tax authority in Member 
State A receives from the taxable person in Member State A a recapitulative 
statement detailing the intra-Community supplies. Based on the recapitulative 
statements VAT is remitted to Member State B from Member State A. The taxable 
person in Member State B is allowed a right of deduction on his domestic VAT 
return in relation to his intra-Community acquisition. He will also be required to 
submit a declaration showing all his intra-Community purchases. 
The Clearing System can thus be seen in three distinct stages: 
•  The first stage is the exchange of information. The Member State of supply, as is 
the case today, will submit information obtained from the recapitulative 
statements. The Member State of acquisition will likewise submit the information 
on the intra-Community purchases for the same period and with an equivalent 
level of detail. 
•  The second stage is the transfer of money. The recapitulative statements from the 
Member States of supply will be netted off and the balance will be paid over by 
the Member State with the higher intra-Community supplies. 
•  The final stage is the evaluation of and resolution of mismatches. As there will be 
recapitulative statements both on intra-Community supplies and purchases, 
Member States will have the opportunity to reconcile the data. 
The following provides more detail on these aspects.  
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2.8.3.  Information used 
In determining the VAT due for intra-Community supplies and corresponding 
deduction claims, the Member States will base themselves on information received 
from taxable persons involved in taxed intra-Community supplies and acquisitions. 
This will include the current recapitulative statement for intra-Community supplies 
along with a new declaration from the recipient of intra-Community supplies. Both 
statements will be monthly and in theory should match. 
In their own interest, Member States will control the information received according 
to the usual standards and they shall exchange recapitulative statements between 
themselves in order to have the same basic information. Furthermore, they may use, 
where needed, administrative cooperation in the usual way. 
2.8.4.  Remittance through a bilateral Clearing System 
The Commission is of the opinion that the clearing should be operated in a purely 
bilateral relationship that opens the possibilities for Member States to agree on any 
detail of importance, taking into account their individual balance of trade, similarities 
of operating the VAT system and their control mechanisms, mutual trust and any 
other circumstance they would judge to be of importance. However, to offer 
guidance and to suggest solutions in the absence of individual agreements, the 
Commission estimates that the distribution of risk should be set in such a way as to 
foster the interest of each Member State to control relevant information in the best 
possible way, and, especially, to combat fraud as efficiently as possible. 
The rules on the transfers via a bilateral Clearing System, whilst allowing Member 
States some degree of flexibility, should nevertheless be underpinned by a common 
framework with clear guidelines. The Commission has not yet finalised the intricate 
details of the working of the clearing system. Yet it is clear that in order to avoid 
budgetary deficits, the first payment would need to be made between Member States 
very soon after the reference month and a “final” settlement of the balance would 
need to be established at other appropriate intervals of six and 12 months. 
2.8.5.  Mismatches 
Mismatches can result from different factors such as any unintended errors as well as 
fraud. 
In theory, mismatches due to timing differences should not occur. Taxable persons 
making intra-Community supplies are subject to a common rule on the chargeability 
of tax
8 and the right to deduct arises at the same time, namely when the tax becomes 
chargeable. However, as Member States do not have a common understanding on 
chargeability to tax, it is inevitable that mismatches will occur due to timing 
differences. Nevertheless, timing differences will, by definition, only be of a 
temporary nature. 
Member States will want to investigate other major mismatches as they are expected 
to do under the current system in order to eliminate them. These mismatches will 
                                                 
8  Article 67 of VAT Directive 2006/112/EC.  
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arise, in simple terms, when the taxable person in the Member State of supply and 
the taxable person in the Member State of acquisition are providing different 
information. In the first stage the Member States should bilaterally try to establish 
the reason for the mismatch through, for instance, contact with the taxable persons 
concerned to establish the facts. A significant number of mismatches should be 
resolved this way. 
Indeed, the self-policing nature of the fractionated VAT system should of itself 
provide reassurance. A taxable person will need to hold a valid invoice
9 to claim a 
right of deduction. The invoice, through accepted audit controls, should be supported 
by other documentary evidence such as a purchase order, a goods transit document, 
updated stock records, payment to the supplier, onward supply of the goods, etc. 
Much of this information can be checked against the supplier or with third parties. 
2.8.6.  Distribution of risks 
Nevertheless, there will remain a number of cases where Member States are unable 
to determine what the reasons of mismatches are and, consequently, which Member 
State bears direct responsibility for the revenue. Since the collection of VAT is a 
competence of the Member States, the allocation of those receipts should remain 
under their competence and, therefore, any system should be run and organised by 
the Member States themselves. 
Lack of revenue to cover the claims of the VAT deduction allowed in the Member 
State of acquisition can always have its source in both Member States: either the 
Member State of supply has not collected enough of the VAT due (supply not 
correctly classified as intra-Community supply, insolvency, missing trader) or the 
Member State of acquisition has accepted VAT claims that were not justified. 
The exact composition and rules of procedure of any system would need to be gone 
into during further discussions. The aim, though, must be to reach a binding decision 
on whether, on the basis of the presented facts, a Member State has an obligation to 
remit money to another Member State through the Clearing System. 
2.8.7.  Conclusion 
The clearing should be organised bilaterally to take into account specific situations 
and to limit as much as possible unnecessary administrative work and cost. Member 
States should base themselves on the recapitulative statements they receive from 
taxable persons to establish their clearing position and to create the necessary 
framework for control and cooperation. Each Member State will bear the risk of what 
he is responsible for, but where lack of revenue cannot be attributed to a specific 
reason, Member States should bear such risk equally. 
2.9.  Conclusion on taxation of intra-Community supplies 
The Commission remains convinced that the taxation of intra-Community supplies of 
goods would contribute effectively to a solution to the problem of MTIC fraud. It 
recognises, however, that such a system also might increase proportionally other 
                                                 
9  Article 178 of VAT Directive 2006/112/EC.  
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already well known types of VAT fraud and expresses some concern as to the effects 
of the cash-flow consequences for businesses and in particular for SMEs — it might 
be worth investigating this issue further. 
The Commission is convinced that there would not be any insurmountable technical 
problem in putting a microeconomic and bilaterally organised clearing system in 
place. 
However, the fundamental question which needs to be answered is whether or not 
Member States could accept a concept that would make them dependent on each 
other for some 10% of their VAT receipts. 
3.  REVERSE CHARGE 
In a traditional VAT system, the supplier charges and pays to the Treasury VAT in 
respect of supplies of goods and services within a Member State. If the customer is a 
(normal) taxable person, then he can recover the VAT charged by claiming it back on 
his VAT declaration. This results in a system of fractionated payment, whereby the 
VAT on the final price to the final consumer is paid to the Treasury by different 
taxable persons in the supply chain in direct proportion to their ‘value added’. This 
interplay of VAT payment on supplies and VAT deduction on purchases is 
traditionally considered as the main feature of VAT, providing for an in-built, largely 
self-policing control mechanism. 
In a reverse-charge system, VAT is accounted for by the taxable customer instead of 
the supplier. As the customer, in so far as he is entitled to full deduction, deducts this 
VAT on the same VAT declaration, the net result is nil and no payment is to be 
made. The reverse charge is not applied to supplies to private individuals and the 
supplier has, in that case, to charge and pay to the Treasury the total amount of VAT. 
There is no fractionated payment in a reverse-charge system as the total VAT is paid 
only at the end of the supply chain. 
Reverse charge can in theory be applied to all Business to Business (B2B) supplies. 
However, in its conclusions of June 2007, the Council specified that under the 
general reverse-charge system the Commission was invited to analyse, a threshold 
would be set at €5 000. This threshold applies for each individual transaction. 
Under such a system, a taxable person will for all his domestic supplies firstly have 
to verify the status of his customer. When the customer does not qualify for the 
application of the reverse charge (mainly private persons but also non-taxable legal 
persons and fully exempt taxable persons) the supplier will have to charge VAT to 
his customer. 
When the customer is a taxable person qualifying for application of the reverse 
charge, the supplier will have to verify the amount of the transaction. 
When the taxable amount of the supply is less then €5 000, the supplier would have 
to charge VAT to his customer. The business customer can deduct this VAT under 
the normal rules.  
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When the taxable amount of the supply is equal to or above €5 000, the supplier will 
not charge VAT on the supply. The business customer will account for the VAT on 
this supply and will be able to deduct this VAT under the normal rules. 
The introduction of a generalised reverse-charge system does not affect the rules for 
taxation of intra-community transactions, nor should it in principle have any bearing 
on transactions with third countries; it only affects the rules for taxation of domestic 
supplies of goods and services. 
Whilst the system of taxation of intra-Community supplies of goods only affects 
businesses carrying out this type of transaction, which seem to be around 9% of the 
taxable persons within the EU, it is likely that a much larger proportion of taxable 
persons would be affected by the introduction of a general reverse-charge system. 
Indeed, even taxable persons mainly dealing with private consumers, and therefore 
not applying the reverse charge on the supplies they make, will be confronted with 
the reverse-charge system when making purchases above the threshold. 
3.1.  Risks of new forms of fraud resulting from the use of a reverse-charge system 
on an optional basis 
3.1.1.  Methodology 
The Commission invited an external consultant to carry out an independent study to 
explore the risk of new forms of VAT fraud deriving from the use of a general 
reverse-charge system on an optional basis for transactions within a Member State, 
where the threshold per invoice amount is set at €5 000. 
Besides describing the new forms of fraud which had been identified, the consultant 
was asked to examine the likelihood of occurrence of those new forms of fraud, 
identify mitigation measures and evaluate their potential impact in tackling fraud. 
Since the study could not be based on existing experiences with the VAT model, it 
was instead based on workshops with experts in VAT and forensic auditing from the 
consultant and also external experts such as specialist lawyers and tax investigation 
officials. 
3.1.2.  Main findings of the study 
There are three main features of the proposed reverse-charge system which are the 
factors triggering the newly identified forms of fraud: 
•  the possibility to acquire goods free of VAT; 
•  the provision of a threshold; 
•  the optional character of the reverse-charge system. 
Based on these three factors, the study comes to the conclusion that the following, 
already existing fraud patterns will be the most likely to increase:  
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•  concentration of fraud at the retail level since it is at that level that the whole 
VAT-collection process will occur. The potential loss of VAT revenue at that 
stage of distribution could in absolute terms be higher compared to the current 
system, as the tax authorities will need to concentrate their audits at the retail 
level, which traditionally comprises economic operators that are more difficult to 
audit due to their number, their dimension and their status; 
•  hijacking of VAT identification numbers (by pure holdings, sham companies, 
non-established taxable persons, end consumers). This type of fraud can be 
committed in order to avoid paying VAT but it could also be used for entering 
goods into the black market. The reverse charge could increase the gain for the 
fraudster and allow him to distribute goods at a lower, and therefore more 
attractive, price (see last point); 
•  abuse by pure holdings of their own, valid VAT Identification number; 
•  migration of missing-trader fraud to Member States not implementing the reverse 
charge and having a high VAT rate; 
•  creation of fake invoices to lower a (high) payment position (the reverse charge 
generates no input VAT); 
•  replication of MTIC patterns in a purely domestic scenario; 
•  easier access of goods to national (and cross-border) black markets and at a more 
attractive price. 
Moreover, the following newly identified methodologies could be used to create 
fraud schemes in the context of reverse charge: 
•  direct or disguised artificial splitting of the taxable amount of a transaction in 
order to circumvent the threshold; 
•  migration of artificial splitting to other Member States that have implemented the 
reverse-charge system and that apply a high VAT rate. 
The objective of such artificial splitting mechanisms would be to create a situation 
whereby a fraudster can buy goods “VAT-free” under the reverse-charge mechanism 
and consequently charge VAT on the onward supplies made for the amounts under 
the threshold; this trader then goes missing and does not pay VAT over to the 
Treasury. 
Looking at the mitigation measures, the study shows that only the interaction of 
several methodologies is likely to be effective in mitigating the risk of VAT fraud 
under the reverse charge. 
In particular, the measures suggested by the consultant for effectively combating all 
the (new) forms of fraud under a domestic reverse-charge system would be: 
•  to implement a mandatory reverse-charge mechanism in all Member States;  
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•  no invoice threshold, but if there was to be one, it should be lower than €5 000; 
•  to implement monthly sales and purchase listings for all domestic transactions, not 
only for the transactions under the reverse charge but also for the transactions 
under the threshold with a view to detecting the artificial splitting of the taxable 
amount; 
•  to use a specific identification for taxable persons qualifying for making purchases 
under the reverse-charge system; 
•  to implement new data-mining tools and new risk indicators; 
•  to improve the registration rules, possibly with de-registration and a new 
registration exercise; 
•  to improve exchanges of information between Member States; 
•  to introduce a computerised taxable person’s identity card showing that the 
taxable person is a bona fide trader. 
The study comes to the conclusion that protecting the application of a reverse-charge 
system against new risks of fraud would require implementation of burdensome 
measures, since it would create the need to monitor on a real-time basis not only 
cross-border supplies but also — to a large extent — purely domestic ones. 
Finally, for the authorities, the system would require a more effective and responsive 
strategy (e.g. exchanges of information and close cooperation) and the 
implementation of new and more modern solutions such as data analysis, data-
mining, predictive modelling, profiling, electronic VAT IDs, “R” numbers, etc. 
3.1.3.  Comments 
General Comments 
The study identified a number of new risks of fraud as well as a number of fraud 
patterns already existing today which might be facilitated by the introduction of a 
generalised reverse-charge system on an optional basis and with application of a 
€5 000 threshold. 
The main risks clearly are the abuse/misuse of VAT identification numbers and 
increased tax losses at the retail level. This last point is also very much emphasised 
by a Portuguese study which was based on a rather specific high proportion of small 
businesses in Portugal subject to specific tax rules. 
The Commission would like to point out that it was in the current context impossible 
to ask for any estimates of the potential losses resulting from the new risks of fraud. 
This would require a substantial economic exercise for which too many factors are 
unknown at this stage. 
Finally, the Commission notes that some of the mitigation measures suggested by the 
consultant, and in particular those which do not put additional burdens on businesses 
(to implement new data-mining tools and new risk indicators; to improve the  
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registration rules, to improve exchanges of information between Member States), are 
not specific to an optional reverse-charge system but are equally important within the 
current VAT arrangements. 
Specific comments on the reporting obligations 
The potential of certain types of fraud, in particular the hijacking of VAT ID 
numbers and the creation of fake invoices, will largely depend on the possibilities for 
their early detection by the tax administrations. 
The reporting requirements to be imposed under a reverse-charge concept constitute 
a key aspect of the mitigation measures. 
The level of detail laid down for the reporting obligations imposed both on the 
supplier and the customer would largely influence the way the tax authorities could 
verify the correct use of the reverse-charge system. 
(a)  No additional reporting obligations 
Information obtained periodically by the tax administration: 
•  from the supplier: the global amount of supplies made under the reverse-charge 
system by the supplier via the VAT return; 
•  from the acquirer: the global amount of VAT due as a result of the reverse-charge 
system and possibly the global amount of purchases made under the reverse-
charge system via the VAT return. 
In this case, there would be no possibility for any initial verification by the tax 
administration at the time of submission of the VAT returns. 
Verification could not be done in a systematic way but only as part of a normal audit. 
Such a system would provide fraud opportunities. Fraudsters could buy goods and 
services without pre-financing the tax and make consequent supplies on the black 
market. It would be sufficient to declare artificial sales under the reverse-charge 
system on the VAT returns. By doing so, the VAT returns would look trustworthy at 
first sight and the fraud could be masked for a long period. 
(b)  Periodical global listing from the supplier, no additional reporting from the 
acquirer 
Information obtained periodically by the tax administration: 
•  from the supplier: a listing containing the VAT number of the acquirer and the 
global value of supplies made to that acquirer for a given period (month, quarter); 
•  from the acquirer: the global amount of VAT due as a result of the reverse-charge 
system and possibly the global amount of purchases made under the reverse-
charge system via the VAT return. 
This information would allow some basic checks to be carried out at the time of 
receipt of the VAT returns and listing.  
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Firstly, the global amount of reverse-charge supplies declared by the supplier in his 
VAT return should correspond to the total amount of supplies declared in the listing. 
When reverse-charge supplies were declared in the VAT return but no listing were 
submitted, it could be an indication of sales wrongly declared as reverse-charge 
supplies. 
Secondly, and more important, a rudimentary “cross checking” would be possible. 
The total amount of supplies declared to an individual acquirer can be compared with 
the global amount of acquisitions the acquirer declared in his VAT return. 
This cross-checking can only reveal mismatches; it does not make it possible to 
identify the source of them. 
The acquirer will be the target of the tax administration investigating the reasons for 
the mismatch. 
If the acquirer declares an amount of acquisitions under reverse charge higher than 
the amount resulting from the suppliers’ listing, the acquirer will have to provide all 
the details of his acquisitions to the tax administration. The tax administration 
requires this information in order to detect the suppliers which have not mentioned 
the acquirer on their listing or have mentioned him but for too low an amount. 
It is only after the tax administrations have compared the data from the listings with 
the more detailed data obtained from the acquirer that the tax administration can 
carry out the second step in the verification process, which is checking with the 
suppliers the reasons for the mismatch. 
If the acquirer declares an amount of acquisitions under reverse charge lower than 
the amount resulting from the suppliers’ listing, the acquirer will again have to 
provide all the details of his acquisitions to the tax administration. 
After comparing the data, the tax administration will have to examine the reasons for 
mismatches. If the acquirer denies having received certain supplies, the tax 
administration will have to check with the supplier the validity of the reverse-charge 
supplies. 
Companies with a lot of suppliers (distribution sector, for example) have an 
increased risk for mismatches due to negligence by the suppliers, material errors, etc. 
These companies run the risk of being constantly bothered by the tax administrations 
examining those mismatches. 
(c)  Periodical global listing from the supplier, periodical global listing from the 
acquirer 
Information obtained periodically by the tax administration, apart from the VAT 
return: 
•  from the supplier: a listing containing the VAT identification number of the 
acquirer and the global value of supplies made to that acquirer for a given period 
(month, quarter);  
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•  from the acquirer: a listing containing the VAT identification number of the 
supplier and the global value of supplies made by that supplier to that acquirer for 
a given period (month, quarter). 
Firstly, there is a possibility to cross-check the VAT return data and the listings, 
both from the supplier and the acquirer. 
This information would also provide the tax administration with an indication of the 
source of the mismatch. In fact, the first step mentioned in the previous system 
(collection of the data from the acquirer) would no longer be necessary. 
The tax administration would still have to investigate, both with regard to the 
supplier and the acquirer, the reasons for the mismatch. 
(d)  Transaction-based listing from the supplier, no additional reporting from the 
acquirer 
Information obtained periodically by the tax administration: 
•  from the supplier: apart from the VAT return, a listing containing for each 
reverse-charge transaction the VAT number of the acquirer and the taxable 
amount; 
•  from the acquirer: in the VAT return the global amount of VAT due as a result of 
the reverse-charge system and possibly the global amount of purchases made 
under the reverse-charge system 
Although the tax administration would obtain more detailed information from the 
supplier, it seems that this possibility would have few advantages compared to the 
system set out in point b above. 
Indeed, only rudimentary cross-checking is possible with the VAT return from the 
acquirer, and additional information will have to be asked from him when the tax 
administrations want to investigate the reasons for the mismatch. 
Therefore, requesting transaction-based information from the supplier does not speed 
up the process by comparison with the global-listing reporting in the first stage, since 
additional information will need to be requested and obtained from the acquirer so as 
to detect the reasons of the mismatch. 
Having transaction-based information directly available within the tax administration 
might facilitate the cross-checking process itself. 
(e)  Transaction-based listing from the supplier, periodical global listing from the 
acquirer 
Information obtained periodically by the tax administration, apart from the VAT 
return: 
•  from the supplier: a listing containing for each reverse-charge transaction the 
VAT number of the acquirer and the taxable amount;  
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•  from the acquirer: a listing containing the VAT number of the supplier and the 
global value of supplies made by each supplier to that acquirer for a given period 
(month, quarter). 
This information would enable the tax administration to cross-check and obtain an 
indication of the source of the mismatch. 
The tax administration would still have to ask for more detailed information from the 
acquirer in order to detect the reasons for the mismatch but only for the transactions 
for which the cross-checking does not tally. 
(f)  Transaction-based listing from the supplier, transaction-based listing from the 
acquirer 
Information obtained periodically by the tax administration, apart from the VAT 
return: 
•  from the supplier: a listing containing for each reverse-charge transaction the 
VAT number of the acquirer and the taxable amount; 
•  from the acquirer: a listing containing for each reverse-charge transaction the 
VAT number of the supplier and the taxable amount. 
This information would enable the tax administration to undertake exhaustive 
cross-checking and would give quite a clear indication of the origin of the 
mismatch (the reason for it would need to be further investigated). 
Comparing the different results, it becomes clear that minimum reporting 
requirements should satisfy (c), (e) or (f) and allow for quick and efficient control. 
It should be pointed out that the above analysis is made from a theoretical control-
efficiency point of view. This aspect has to be considered in a broader perspective, 
notably taking into account the tax administrations’ capacity to effectively analyse 
the mismatches and whether the costs for businesses resulting from these reporting 
obligations would be acceptable within the Lisbon Agenda context. 
Specific comment on the threshold 
The study suggests the elimination of the threshold in order to increase the 
robustness of the reverse-charge system. In the Commission’s view, this might 
nevertheless have some adverse effects. Indeed, the lower the threshold is set (in 
extremis at zero) the more attractive the system becomes for the new fraud scenarios 
allowing the acquisition of goods free of VAT; the higher the threshold is set the 
more attractive becomes the organisation VAT-deduction-related fraud and in 
particular the replication of the MTIC pattern in the domestic scenario. The 
Commission is therefore of the opinion that the threshold of €5  000 retained by 
ECOFIN for the further analysis should not be placed in question.  
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3.1.4.  Conclusion 
The Commission considers that so far no real experience with a generalised reverse-
charge system exists that could confirm or contest the more theoretical findings of 
the study — even using the knowledge of experienced VAT experts. 
Therefore, the Commission cannot come to a clear conclusion on whether the new 
frauds which would be possible as a result of reverse charge would result in a greater 
or a lesser loss to Member States’ Treasuries than that which they currently face as a 
result of MTIC fraud. What is very clear, is that the scale of MTIC fraud would be 
substantially reduced as a result of introducing a reverse charge with a limit per 
invoice, because fraudsters would then have to split invoices many times to achieve 
the same result. 
On the other hand, the black economy forms a major part of non-collected VAT. The 
important question remains as to whether, compared to the current system, the 
introduction of a reverse-charge system would facilitate the deviation of goods from 
the official circuit to the black market or not, and if the loss of VAT due to such 
deviation would be greater under the reverse-charge system compared to the current 
system. 
3.2.  Costs for taxpayers and administrations 
3.2.1.  The costs for taxable persons 
3.2.1.1.  Methodology 
The Commission was of the opinion that to analyse the possible impact on businesses 
in terms of additional costs, it had to rely on the input provided by the taxpayers 
concerned. 
The objective of the study was to explore the impact of a generalised reverse-charge 
mechanism with a sample of 20 companies in order to have an indication on the 
administrative costs (one-off and recurring costs) for businesses, the impact on their 
cash flow and the potential impact on their competitiveness within the internal 
market. 
It should be pointed out that the very small sample used does not allow for any 
extrapolation of the costs for businesses within the EU. On the other hand, it was 
impossible within the short timeframe to request a more extensive study. 
The study was followed by a public consultation launched on the TAXUD website 
whereby businesses were invited to submit to the Commission their reactions and 
contributions concerning the issues raised by the study. A total of 335 contributions 
were received in response. Of that total, 33 were from national and European 
federations or associations, 42 were from large, multinational businesses and 260 
were from smaller, national traders, most of them based in Austria where the issue is 
highly topical. 
Whereas the replies from SMEs’ to a large extent came from all sectors and branches 
(manufactures, traders, service providers, construction sector, transport sector, food, 
HORECA, etc.), the replies from countries other than Austria represented mainly  
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large, international operating enterprises and national or European trade and service 
associations. 
The responses covered a wide range of industry and business sectors. The main 
sectors that responded were consultants, accountants and law firms, trade, the 
construction sector, engineering, electronics and IT sectors, the transport sector, 
industry, the metal and steel sectors, and the food and HORECA sector. 
3.2.1.2.  Main findings of the study and analysis of the responses to the public consultation 
(1)  Impact on administrative costs and additional burdens 
The consultant came to the conclusion that introducing a reverse-charge mechanism 
would lead to both additional one-off and recurring administrative costs. The 
obligation to issue compliant sales invoices is by far the most costly formal 
obligation. This is mainly due to the requirement to apply the reverse charge only to 
transactions exceeding a specified threshold. Applying such a threshold is costly to 
automate and leads to manual processing of exceptions. 
The highest recurring costs are caused by the obligation to file a general purchase 
and sales listing electronically, the obligation to issue compliant sales invoices and 
the obligation to register purchase invoices correctly. The recurring burden appears 
relatively high for small and medium-sized companies because these companies still 
rely heavily on manual processes, which leaves a lot of room for errors and hence 
there is a need for either upfront control or time spent making corrections. 
The replies received in the context of the public consultation largely confirmed that a 
high amount of one-off costs would arise due to the necessary changes and 
adaptation of the IT systems and corresponding costs, such as identification of status 
for all clients and customers, changing administrative and organisational procedures, 
training staff, additional reporting obligations, etc. 
Recurring costs would arise due to additional listing and reporting obligations (and 
respective record-keeping requirements) and the initial and ongoing verification and 
monitoring of the status of each customer. Application of the threshold and 
identification of customer status were identified as the most costly aspects of a 
general reverse-charge system. 
Concerning explicit cost estimates and figures, most replies said that estimates would 
not be possible before more details on the envisaged legal provisions and the 
respective administrative obligations for traders became available. However, several 
respondents provided figures, analysis of which shows that these vary a lot and 
would be difficult to collate meaningfully. 
In any case most of the respondents expect rather high additional costs and 
administrative burdens and therefore consider that from the view of cost/benefit the 
measure would not be efficient or even proportionate. 
(2)  Impact on cash flow and cross-border competitiveness  
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The study indicated that the cash-flow impact mainly depends on the company’s 
business model and is influenced by the company’s import/export situation as well as 
payment lead times with regard to both suppliers and customers. 
The public consultation confirmed that the impact on cash flow varies greatly, and 
strongly depends on the place of the business in the supply chain, the volume of its 
purchases and sales and its terms of payment and negotiating power. On average, 
there seems to be a positive cash-flow impact due to the fact that input VAT would 
no longer have to be pre-financed. However, this would not level out the additional 
administrative costs. 
(3)  Any other impact (cost and/or benefit) and further comments 
It was mentioned that the increased complexity of the VAT system arising from a 
reverse-charge mechanism would probably lead to a higher number of accidental 
reporting mistakes or data mismatches and to the potential risk of being held liable 
for VAT in cases where customer identifications turn out to be wrong. This leads to 
the demand to impose clear legal provisions, simple reporting obligations and a high 
level of legal certainty for traders in respect of identification and monitoring of 
customer status. 
Traders who carry out business activities in several Member States emphasised that 
the introduction of a general reverse-charge system on an optional basis would be 
extremely problematic, since they would have to cope with different systems in 
different Member States. This would lead to a significant lower level of 
harmonisation and would negatively influence and burden their cross-border 
activities. 
(4)  Conclusion 
The majority of respondents were very sceptical about the proposed changes in the 
VAT system with respect to introducing a general reverse-charge system on an 
optional basis. However, there were also a reasonable number of respondents who 
said they could agree with the proposed changes or were even in favour of it. Around 
20% of the replies saw certain advantages arising from a general reverse-charge 
mechanism. However, most of these positive replies stated that the reverse-charge 
mechanism should only be introduced without a threshold and be made compulsory 
for all Member States. Otherwise, traders would be faced with two different systems 
on a national and an EU level, which would negatively influence their cross-border 
activities and the functioning of the internal market. 
It became clear that businesses were strongly concerned about increased complexity 
and a step being taken backwards from harmonisation of the VAT system. Any new 
administrative burden on legitimate business would only be accepted if it were 
absolutely essential and efficient in the fight against VAT fraud. In addition, any 
change introduced should be clearly structured, simple to operate and the rules 
should be consistent across all Member States.  
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3.2.2.  The costs for tax administrations 
3.2.2.1.  Methodology 
The Commission was of the opinion that only the tax authorities themselves could 
provide relevant data for analysis of this issue. 
A number of questions were therefore addressed to the Member States in order to 
determine the actual running costs of managing the current VAT system and an 
obtain an estimate of the costs for running the VAT system under a general reverse-
charge mechanism. 
In particular, Member States were asked to indicate what would be the effect of 
implementing the reverse charge on different types of cost such as publication costs 
for the trader population, training existing staff, taking on additional staff, changing 
the control system, adapting the IT structure and transition costs. Moreover, Member 
States were asked to estimate the potential impact on the cash flow in the year of 
introduction and the estimated impact resulting from the change in collection patterns 
(more VAT to be collected from retailers under the reverse-charge system). 
The questionnaire was sent to all Member States. Only 23 Member States replied to 
it. 
Of these: 
•  seven Member States did not provide any information about the total yearly 
running costs of managing the current VAT system; 
•  another seven Member States did not reply to the question on the estimated costs 
under the reverse-charge system. 
Moreover, several Member States provided general answers to the questions about 
the costs (or only to some of them) without indicating figures. 
On the basis of this fragmented information, the Commission is not in a position to 
provide a solid analysis of this aspect raised by the Council. The comments below 
reflect what the Commission was able to draw on from the input received from the 
Member States. 
3.2.2.2.  Analysis of the responses to the questionnaire 
(1)  General observation 
It needs to be borne in mind that, regardless of the introduction of the reverse-charge 
system, the yearly running costs of managing the current VAT system or tax system 
in general (data referring to 2005 and 2006) increased by less than 1% on average in 
all Member States (except for one Member State where running costs decreased). 
Based on the replies provided by the Member States, the Commission has tried to 
make a very rough estimate of the average cost for the tax administration related to 
introduction of the reverse-charge system.  
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The estimated costs in the first year of introduction of the reverse-charge system 
represent, on average, about 21% of the total running costs of managing the current 
VAT system. 
For calculating this EU average, only the answers of Member States which indicated 
figures (only eight Member States) could be taken into account. 
Moreover, this percentage actually has to be considered to be rather conservative 
because some of these eight Member States only provided a partial reply, indicating 
figures for some but not for all costs involved (although they recognise the relevance 
of them). 
The Commission would like to stress the indicative character of the estimate, due to 
the fact that the data available are not sufficient to make a calculation which is 
sufficiently solid from a statistical point of view. 
(2)  More detailed comments 
(a)  On the costs 
All Member States which provided input estimate that the introduction of a 
generalised reverse-charge system will generate additional costs for the tax 
authorities in the year of introduction. In general the most important costs are 
publication costs for the trader population and costs for training and taking on 
additional staff. 
Two Member States indicated that they predicted a reduction of the burden of the tax 
administration in the long run, since control of input-tax deduction would be 
improved and facilitated considerably. Moreover, the risk of MTIC fraud would be 
eliminated. This factor should have a positive impact on the tax administration’s 
running costs in managing the VAT system. 
While three Member States did not provide an estimate of the additional costs, they 
referred to previous experience, notably with the introduction of sectorial reverse-
charge applications in their country, to make clear that there will be a cost. 
Most remarks concern one-off costs, with adaptation of IT structure, training of 
existing staff and publication costs being those most cited. Changing the tax 
administrations’ control system seemed to be considered less problematic. 
Recurring costs following the implementation of the reverse-charge system were in 
general not commented upon. 
(b)  Impact on cash flow 
Whilst one Member State predicted a cash-flow benefit resulting from the 
introduction of the reverse-charge system, a number of other Member States estimate 
significant cash-flow loss in the year the reverse charge is introduced. Two Member 
States predicted a loss which they found to be difficult to evaluate at this stage. The 
majority of Member States did not comment on this specific point.  
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The Commission notes that neither those Member States expecting a positive cash-
flow benefit nor those predicting a negative benefit clearly explained in their replies 
how they arrived at that conclusion. In the Commission’s view, there should not be 
any major cash-flow effect for the Treasury as, on the one hand, there may be some 
advantage from the elimination of VAT deduction before payment whereas, on the 
other hand, there might be a small timing effect as to the time lag until VAT is paid 
at the final stage of retail. 
(c)  Change in the collection patterns 
Two Member States did not think there would be any problems since the total VAT 
amount paid by the whole supply chain would be the same. The difference would be 
that under the reverse-charge system the retailer would pay the total VAT amount to 
the State whilst under the current system he would pay VAT both to the supplier and 
the State. One of these Member States posited that tax collection should improve 
since more detailed information would be available about the purchases made by the 
retailer. 
A number of Member States expressed concerns about the change in collection 
patterns. Member States indicated that tax fraud was expected to move to the retail-
sale level, since the reverse-charge system does not eliminate fraud at this stage of 
the delivery chain and merely moves the risk of fraud to that final stage. It should be 
noted that the producer of goods, the main “source” of budget revenues in the current 
system, rarely “vanishes“. Transfer of the liability for payment of VAT to the 
purchaser eliminates this “sure source” of revenue. 
In addition it was pointed out that a large part of the collected VAT would move 
from the intermediary stages of the production and distribution chain of goods and 
services to the last stage — direct contact with the final consumer. There is a large 
number of very small businesses at this stage which are difficult — and expensive — 
to control. Due to that dissemination effect in VAT collection, a disproportionate 
increase in the running costs for managing the VAT system and greater difficulties in 
collecting the tax are to be expected. 
One Member State has signalled that it had carried out a detailed econometric study 
of the possible imposition of a general reverse charge, and while the conclusion from 
that study was that the introduction of reverse charging would result in only a small 
loss of revenue, what was more disturbing was the way the tax receipts would 
become dependent on businesses operating in areas which are historically difficult to 
control. In this Member State, it was notable than more than 30% of the VAT paid 
into the Treasury was paid by less than 1% of all taxable persons. The study also 
demonstrates that in this specific Member State the contribution — in the form of 
payments of VAT made to the Treasury — from large taxpayers is reduced from 
47% of the total VAT revenue to 25% of the total under the reverse-charge system. 
The contribution from small taxpayers under a reverse-charge system would increase 
from 1% to 33% of total VAT revenue. 
So while at first sight there is theoretically almost no loss/gain in VAT receipts, the 
continuation of this situation would be directly proportional to the amount of effort 
tax administrations invest in controlling the retailers who up to now were not key  
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players in the context of VAT payments to the Treasury. This would, however, very 
much depend on the specific circumstances in an individual Member State. 
(3)  Other general remarks 
Three Member States predicted a rise in costs and of legal proceedings linked to 
correct application of the new system. They do not believe there will be any 
budgetary benefit for the State. 
3.2.3.  Conclusion 
On the basis of the input provided by the Member States, the Commission has come 
to the conclusion that the Council has asked them to analyse an aspect, namely the 
costs to administrative authorities of implementing a reverse-charge system, on 
which the Member States themselves do not have sufficient data available allowing 
them to provide the necessary input for such an analysis. 
At a very general level, it can be concluded that all Member States predicted an 
additional cost at the time of introducing the reverse-charge system. However, two 
Member States are convinced this cost will be compensated by the advantages of the 
system once it is up and running. 
The change in the collection patterns should in theory not affect the ultimate amount 
of VAT collected. Indeed, the VAT collected under the current system from the large 
taxpayers — which are mainly involved in B2B transactions — is deductible at the 
same time by the recipient of the goods or services. However, the fact that a 
relatively small number of taxpayers ensure — in their role as unpaid tax collectors 
— that a major part of VAT revenues effectively enters the Treasury in time and with 
little effort from the tax administrations is considered to be one of the VAT system’s 
major advantages. 
The Commission would like to point out that since Member States have the primary 
responsibility for managing the VAT system, the costs of managing that system are 
primarily their concern. However, in the end citizens, but also businesses, bear the 
cost of public services; therefore there is a link between the efficiency of a tax 
administration and the European policy of pursuing the Lisbon Agenda. 
While reverse charge might, at first sight, appear to be seductive from a business 
perspective, particularly as firms would no longer have to pre-finance the VAT on 
their supplies, the reaction from business does not generally recognise this issue, 
which could be seen to be an advantage. Businesses rather highlighted the difficulty 
they perceive in complying with the ensuing obligations. 
The study on the costs for business demonstrates that a change towards a reverse-
charge system leads inevitably to additional costs for traders; business will therefore 
need to be convinced about the advantages of such a change. 
Indeed, the study demonstrates that the main cost factor is ensuring compliance with 
two different sets of VAT rules for domestic transactions caused by the fact that 
reverse charge would only apply to transactions exceeding a specified threshold. 
Moreover, if an optional reverse charge were to be introduced within the EU, traders  
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having economic activities in several Member States could also be confronted with 
substantially different VAT systems within the EU. Both situations are a major 
concern for businesses since any further degree of disharmonisation leads inevitably 
to additional costs. 
The Commission supports businesses’ desire to ensure that costs and unnecessary 
bureaucracy are kept to a minimum. It also understands their desire for legal 
certainty regarding transactions and fully shares the opinion that the introduction of 
additional complexities into the VAT system should be avoided. 
3.3.  Effects of a generalised reverse-charge system on other Member States 
3.3.1.  Methodology 
The Commission was of the opinion that it would have to rely on the input from 
national tax authorities to analyse such effects. Firstly, they were invited to share 
their experiences in respect of the sectorial reverse-charge mechanism, based on 
Articles 194, 199 and 395 of the VAT Directive although the Commission is well 
aware that not all Member States had such experiences. 
The questions addressed to the Member States about their experiences covered two 
aspects: on the one hand, the effects of application of a reverse-charge mechanism in 
another Member State and, on the other, the effects on the other Member States of 
introducing a reverse-charge mechanism at national level. 
Secondly, Member States were also asked to share their expertise concerning the risk 
of fraud migration, as this issue has been raised on several occasions during the 
technical discussions on introduction of a generalised reverse-charge system. The 
Commission was interested in Member States’ expertise in identifying potential 
fraud patterns in this area. 
The questionnaire was sent to all Member States, 23 of which replied. While some 
Member States provided detailed responses, others were very brief (yes/no/not 
applicable) without further explanations; some questionnaires were even returned 
completely blank. 
3.3.2.  Analysis of responses 
(1)  Experiences of migration of fraud in the past as a result of the implementation 
of a reverse-charge mechanism in other Member States 
Most Member States replied that they had not experienced in the past the 
phenomenon of migration of fraud as a result of the implementation of a reverse-
charge mechanism in another Member State. In fact, only two Member States 
witnessed a migration of fraud due to implementation of a reverse-charge mechanism 
in a neighbouring Member State (one Member State in the scrap metal sector, one 
Member State in the investment gold sector experienced after it joined the EU). Both 
Member States implemented a reverse-charge mechanism in the sectors concerned in 
order to stop the migration of fraud. 
The great majority of Member States indicated that in the current situation there is no 
(measurable) evidence of migration of fraud due to implementation of a reverse- 
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charge mechanism. However, some of them pointed out that this does not mean that 
this phenomenon did not occur. 
As a consequence, Member States did not have information regarding types of 
fraudulent activity, nor could they say that migration of fraud would be an essential 
factor when considering implementation of a reverse-charge mechanism in their own 
country. 
A number of particular arguments were given as to why Member States have not 
experienced, to date, a migration of fraud due to the introduction of a reverse-charge 
mechanism or why there was an absence of this phenomenon: 
•  A specific investigation has never been carried out to that purpose. 
•  The short period since joining the Single Market by the new Member States. 
•  Since the reverse-charge mechanism implemented in the UK for computer 
components and mobile phones only came into force on 1 June 2007, the Member 
States are not yet aware of the possible effects of such implementation. This does 
not mean that the UK mechanism did not produce migration of fraud, and in the 
run-up to the derogation decision there were indeed very strong concerns leading 
to a more narrow scope than initially envisaged by the UK. It appears to be too 
early for the tax administrations to detect possible effects from the reverse-charge 
mechanism entering into force in the UK. 
•  For the previous derogations granted on the basis of Article 27 of the Sixth 
Directive (now Article 395 of the VAT Directive), the purpose of some of these 
derogations was not to prevent fraud but to simplify the collection of tax for the 
Member States. Furthermore, the scope was limited to particular activities/sectors 
with no direct output to the general public or retail level. As a consequence, there 
was no risk of false sales to the final consumer and limited risk that retail 
companies would disappear after collecting the VAT from final consumers. 
Moreover, after transformation of the products falling under the derogations, the 
subsequent transactions up to the final customer follow the normal rules of VAT 
collection. 
•  Some Member States emphasised that the scope of applicable reverse-charge 
systems in Member States at the moment only target specific or partial sectors and 
for some Member States almost exclusively in the services sector, where the place 
of taxation for such service is mainly situated on the spot and thus not movable. 
The risk of fraud migration and its extent are different, probably greater and wider 
in the generalised reverse-charge system which covers goods as well. Any 
comparison with a reverse-charge system in a Member State is therefore 
extremely distorted. 
(2)  Effects of the implementation of a reverse-charge mechanism at national level 
on the other Member States 
Member States could not clearly indicate whether they had seen an increase in cross-
border activities (suggesting untaxed goods moving to other Member States) in cases 
where they had implemented a national sectorial reverse-charge mechanism in their  
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own country, nor could they clearly indicate whether they saw a relocation of 
business to other Member States after their country had implemented a domestic 
reverse-charge mechanism. 
The Member States appeared to have no data available to support any other 
conclusion. The fact that some of the reverse-charge systems came into force only 
very recently and their limited scope may be a reason why the Member States had 
not yet noticed such a phenomenon. 
One Member State believes that there is no carousel fraud anymore in the sector of 
investment gold, following the introduction of the reverse charge. Another Member 
State witnessed a decrease in the number of traders and also a decrease in the 
turnover after they introduced a reverse-charge mechanism in the scrap metal sector 
(but which only targets the beginning of the collection chain). 
(3)  Risk of fraud moving from a Member State applying the reverse-charge 
system to a Member State not applying it 
(a)  General 
The Member States were asked whether they believed there is a real risk of fraud 
moving from a Member State applying the reverse charge to a Member State not 
applying it, and what kind of additional measures need to be implemented in the 
Member State applying reverse charge in order to reduce this risk. 
Two Member States are of the opinion that there is no risk of fraud moving to other 
countries if the reverse-charge system is implemented with safeguards. The vast 
majority of the other Member States are of the opinion that there could be a real risk 
of fraud moving from a Member State applying the reverse-charge system to 
Member States not applying it. One further Member State pointed out that it depends 
on the economic sector, i.e. there is a real risk in the scrap metal sector. 
(b)  Potential risk(s) described by the Member States 
A number of Member States also explained in detail why they think there is a higher 
risk of fraud moving if an (optional general) reverse-charge mechanism is 
implemented: 
•  Rerouting of the fraud traffic to other Member States where administrative 
resistance (audit/prosecution/penalties etc.) is perceived to be the least (nine 
Member States). 
•  Spreading of the fraud to a broader spectrum of commodities (not only mobile 
phones and CPUs), which makes it more difficult to set up precise risk profiles 
(two Member States) (only applicable to a targeted reverse charge). 
•  Difficulties in ensuring adequate administrative follow-up of the flow of goods 
operating through the Member States that apply the reverse-charge system (one 
Member State).  
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•  Increased activity in the black economy due to a decrease in controls. In a reverse-
charge system it is feared that supervision by the Member State that introduced 
the reverse charge will gradually erode. It will be focusing its control methods on 
its own retailers, from which the Member State obtains its income, instead of 
focusing on intra-Community trade. This deterioration of information will result 
in Member States being less well prepared to effectively fight against MTIC fraud 
(two Member States). 
•  There could by a shift to activities which do not fall under the reverse-charge 
mechanism (one Member State). 
•  The reverse-charge system could lead to more fictitious intra-Community 
transactions and thus more missing traders (one Member State). 
(4)  Additional measures to reduce the risk of migration of fraud 
Member States were asked to indicate what accompanying measures would need to 
be implemented in a Member State deciding to apply the reverse charge in order to 
reduce the potential risk of migration of fraud. 
One Member State considers that there is no need for additional measures because 
they do not see a risk. The Commission finds this reply surprising since all 
supporters of a reverse-charge system have so far advocated the need for 
accompanying reporting obligations. One Member State considers the reverse-charge 
system an efficient tool for limiting tax fraud possibilities (however not a general 
system but for particular areas). 
The other Member States consider that the risk of migration of fraud can only be 
tackled if the Member States applying reverse-charge systems implement additional 
obligations and control efforts. The current available measures appear to be 
insufficient to address this risk. 
The Member States also believe that the effectiveness and quality of the controls play 
an important role in where fraudsters decide to operate. 
The additional measures indicated by some of the Member States as being necessary 
when implementing a generalised reverse-charge system are: 
(a)  Additional reporting obligations: 
•  Both seller and purchaser must submit transaction lists on reverse-charge 
transactions and these lists should be included in an electronic information 
system. 
•  Member States must share information on risky traders (one Member State). 
•  Suppliers operating under the reverse-charge procedure should obtain their 
customers’ VAT registration number and satisfy themselves as far as possible that 
the number is genuine and the particular conditions are met (one Member State).  
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•  Spontaneous exchange of information by Member States applying the reverse 
charge, e.g. information concerning observed phenomena, suspicious activities of 
taxpayers or indeed lists of entities (persons) which have ceased or significantly 
changed their activities following the implementation of this system (one Member 
State). 
•  Obligation to declare each reverse-charge transaction on line and to obtain prior 
authorisation for each transaction (one Member State). 
(b)  Additional control efforts: 
•  Suppliers must check the customer’s ID (entrepreneurial status) and store 
documentation for these checks (three Member States). 
•  Tax administration has to develop a specific risk-management system to monitor 
the businesses applying the reverse charge (one Member State). 
•  Follow-up of the flow of goods by cross-checking each operation between 
supplier and customer at very short intervals, although it seems doubtful that tax 
administrations have the capacity to handle this quantity of data (two Member 
States). 
•  Implementation of stricter field controls of businesses applying the reverse-charge 
mechanism (one Member State). 
•  Cultivate audit officials’ awareness of the fact that auditing along the distribution 
chain is necessary not only to safeguard VAT on final consumption in their own 
Member State but also in all other Member States (one Member State). 
•  Setting-up a database containing all suppliers applying the reverse charge and the 
use of targeted and fast information-exchange mechanisms (such as Eurocanet) to 
monitor reverse-charge transactions (one Member State). 
Two Member States have real doubts about the efficiency of the possible additional 
reporting and control obligations. One Member State considers that each additional 
measure will increase the burden on businesses and tax administrations. Therefore, it 
could be a good idea to strengthen existing measures (quicker exchange of 
information and higher frequency of recapitulative statements). 
3.3.3.  Administrative cooperation as a tool against migration of fraud 
The Member States were asked whether they found administrative cooperation 
measures effective in tackling the migration of fraud. 
Three Member States stated they have no opinion or consider the question irrelevant, 
since they had not noticed any migration of fraud. Four Member States consider that 
they cannot evaluate the efficiency of the administrative cooperation because there is 
currently no (evidence of) migration of fraud caused by the implementation of a 
reverse-charge system in another Member State. Furthermore, they consider that the 
Member States that implemented the reverse-charge system must take the necessary 
measures to prevent migration of fraud.  
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Nevertheless, the majority of Member States replied to the question on the 
assumption that migration of fraud might occur. They acknowledge the essence and 
usefulness of administrative cooperation measures in tackling the migration of fraud, 
although they consider that this cooperation should be more intensive and could be 
improved through a number of actions for: 
•  quicker and flexible exchange of information (four Member States), and meeting 
of deadlines (two Member States); 
•  reduced timeframes for the VAT Information Exchange System (VIES), because 
currently the Member State of destination receives the information too late (three 
Member States); 
•  more detailed information on the tax forms (one Member State); 
•  spontaneous exchange of information concerning new frauds identified 
(fraudsters, new goods used for fraudulent activities) (one Member State); 
•  spontaneous exchange of information concerning new amendments to national 
regulations in accordance with the fight against specific fraud (one Member 
State); 
•  more use of the Trend Information Exchange Form (one Member State). 
Four Member States mentioned explicitly the usefulness of the Eurocanet system as a 
tool in the fight against fraud, since suspicious cross-border transactions are 
continuously stored in this system. 
3.3.4.  Effects on legitimate businesses 
No Member State thought that their businesses operating in a in a domestic market 
where the traditional VAT system operated would suffer as a result of having to 
compete with businesses operating in a reverse-charge market, where no VAT for 
business-to-business transactions was charged. 
Member States did, however, see difficulties (and this is echoed by businesses) in 
situations where businesses were operating across the EU and would be required to 
adapt their systems in order to accommodate the reverse charge in a Member State. 
In that respect, businesses would be required to operate both the reverse-charge and 
the normal scheme in those Member States which have not adopted the reverse 
charge, and for business-to-consumer and transactions below the threshold in a 
Member State operating the reverse charge. This plethora of administrative systems 
may make their companies less competitive compared to those which deal with fewer 
administrative burdens and accounting systems. This is in addition to any extra 
reporting requirements which may be required in a Member State operating a 
reverse-charge measure. 
3.3.5.  Conclusion 
So far experiences of migrated fraud are fairly non-existent other than a few specific 
cases in the scrap metal sector. However, the reverse charges most Member States  
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apply today are targeted on particular commodities, and are often intended to combat 
frauds in which a small subcontractor works for a large business, collects the tax and 
fails to pay it. Often the commodities involved, such as waste, are of no interest for 
the general population and the reverse charge operates in a strictly defined, confined 
market. 
This situation is different from the application of a wide reverse charge, where a 
large proportion of the goods supplied under the measure would be destined for the 
general retail market, with the tax being collected at that stage. 
It is here that many Member States believed the greatest risk to their budgets and 
markets lay. They stressed the need for adequate control of the reverse charge, 
fearing that a plethora of untaxed goods would reach the markets of other Member 
States. This is because, at present, when goods are dispatched to another Member 
State, a right of refund is generated for the dispatching business. In order to receive 
this refund, certain obligations have to be fulfilled and the tax authorities in the 
Member State would carry out adequate checks to ensure the dispatch is genuine 
before making the repayment. 
Under the reverse-charge system, however, this would not be the case as the business 
making the intra-Community dispatch would at most be in a small refund position 
due to purchases of low-value items or overheads below the threshold. Member 
States fear that, because the Member State of dispatch no longer faces a significant 
revenue risk, fewer resources would be targeted at policing intra-Community 
supplies. Indeed, some Member States believe that, as the greatest risk to domestic 
revenue would come from the retail end of the chain, the resources would simply not 
be available for policing dispatches to other Member States. 
To counter such risks — more felt than clearly established — Member States suggest 
robust control measures. The Commission sees — as already explained — reporting 
requirements to be a key element, but administrative capacity also appears to be just 
as important, i.e. modern risk selection, audit capacities, monitoring tax-payers’ 
registrations, etc. The Commission has the feeling that some of the contributions 
translate the fear of Member States that a Member State applying the general reverse 
charge would not be sufficiently motivated to effectively control its own businesses 
in situations where there is no risk to its own revenue, and thus would put at risk 
other Member States’ revenues relating to cross-border trade. However, no evidence 
has been cited in that respect nor any example given from the past. 
Moreover, Member States think that the existing administrative cooperation 
framework is not yet effective enough and does not allow a timely flow of relevant 
information: the effectiveness of the fight against the potential migration of MTIC 
fraud largely depends on a swift pro-active response necessitating targeted and 
quality information. 
As to the impacts on businesses, the results clearly confirm the need to fully take into 
account additional costs generated by a change in system and not only in respect of 
established businesses but also — and perhaps even more so — regarding businesses 
situated in other Member States.  
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3.4.  Coherence and harmonisation of VAT law in the EU 
3.4.1.  The aim of harmonisation 
The fundamental principles outlined in the Treaty of Rome lie at the heart of the 
VAT system and have been consistently followed over the fifty years since the 
Treaty. These are that the VAT system should move towards harmonisation to the 
extent that this is necessary ‘to ensure the establishment and the functioning of the 
internal market’. The Treaty was followed in 1967 by the First Directive on the 
harmonisation of legislation of Member States concerning turnover taxes 
(67/227/EEC), which aimed to reduce distortions of competition and promote the 
free movement of goods and services within the common market. The Directive 
abolished the various turnover-tax systems operating in Member States at that time 
(which were recognised as a hindrance to the efforts being taken to create a coherent 
union) and replaced them with a common system of Value Added Tax. 
The First Directive only outlined in broad terms the working of the harmonised VAT 
system and was accompanied, at the same time, by the Second VAT Directive, which 
specified the principles regarding rates and the right of deduction. However, spurred 
on by the Council Decision of 21st April 1970 stating that, from 1975, the 
Community budget would be financed by own resources, of which VAT would be an 
innovative feature, the concept of a harmonised VAT system was further developed 
with the introduction of the 6th Directive (77/388/EEC) in 1977 (itself recast and 
simplified in Directive 2006/112/EC). This Directive brought together the rules for 
the common system of VAT, and acts as a model for many tax systems 
internationally. The Directive aimed to further align the system, and whilst it did not 
achieve complete harmonisation, allowing Member States some flexibility on various 
aspects such as rates, it was a significant step towards the commonality which had 
been the driving principle of the Community. Many of the flexibilities and 
derogations allowed to Member States are either explicitly limited in time or remain 
in place until the imposition of a definitive, harmonised system based on a system of 
taxation in the Member State of origin. 
The progress towards more harmonisation and the effective removal of barriers to 
integrated trade was subsequently developed, with initiatives such as the elimination 
of internal borders in 1993 (which required closer cooperation between Member 
States), the SLIM (Simplification of Legislation in the Internal Market) initiative, the 
abandonment of the need for a fiscal representative for cross-border trade, and 
legislative changes such as the invoicing Directive in 2001. This progress is being 
further developed in current and future dossiers, such as the VAT package, 
simplification measures for small businesses, and VAT rates. A wide reverse charge 
would expressly contradict the direction of developments in the VAT system, 
which has been driving towards easing trade in the EU and reducing the 
burdens on businesses. 
Thus, there is a clear imperative to design the tax in a way that it should be non- 
discriminatory as regards the origin of goods and services and neutral as to their 
stage of production or distribution, so that a common market permitting fair 
competition and resembling a real internal market may ultimately be achieved. 
Harmonised rules exist so as to set the conditions necessary for an internal market: 
best examples are the fundamental principles, such as the definition of a taxable  
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person, the concept of taxable transactions and the place where supplies, acquisitions 
and imports are to be taxed. Article 395 of Directive 2006/112/EEC derogations are 
only allowed under specific conditions and in limited areas, but on the whole VAT is 
a transaction-based tax in which the revenue flows along the chain of transactions 
and VAT is collected and charged at each stage of the production, thus giving it a 
fractionated nature. 
A generalised reverse-charge system would create a fundamental shift in the 
application of the VAT system, effectively eliminating its self-regulating, 
fractionated nature and putting the onus of collection onto the final stage of the 
transaction chain. This would have a number of repercussions affecting the general 
coherence and harmonisation of the VAT system. An optional reverse charge would 
threaten the fundamental drive towards harmonisation which has been the 
cornerstone of the VAT legislation in the fifty years since the Treaty of Rome, and 
would represent a significant step in the opposite direction. However, of particular 
concern would be the operation of two distinct systems in the EU which would 
come with an optional reverse charge, and the threat to the coherence of the VAT 
system, compromising its ability to accommodate current and future legislative 
changes which benefit the European Community as a whole. 
3.4.2.  The elimination of the fractionated system and practical application of the reverse 
charge 
The fractionated procedure is one of the fundamental principles of the VAT system 
and provides it with a largely successful self-regulating mechanism, in that the output 
tax of one business is the input tax of another, providing both with an incentive to 
declare the tax correctly. In addition, it also means that, where a business fails to pay 
the VAT due to the administration, in most cases it is a fraction of the VAT which is 
lost, rather than the whole amount. It is true that both the fractionated system and the 
wide reverse charge rely on the sale to the final consumer (as VAT is a consumption 
tax) for the payment of the VAT in a transaction chain, but the way the tax is 
collected before this final consumption fundamentally differs between the two 
systems. In the fractionated system, the vast majority of businesses pay a fraction of 
the VAT to the Treasury regardless of where they are in the transaction chain. Under 
the reverse-charge system, the business which sells to the final consumer is mainly 
the only one in the transaction chain in a payment position. This fact concentrates the 
risk of non-payment of the VAT at the end of the transaction chain. 
In fundamentally altering the nature of the VAT system by removing the fractionated 
system and shifting the responsibility of payment to the final stage, a general reverse 
charge would remove the incentive for businesses to account for the VAT properly. 
In that respect, and in order to ensure that transactions are nevertheless accounted for 
correctly, it would be necessary to impose additional reporting obligations on 
businesses
10. Furthermore, under the reverse charge, the VAT treatment of a supply 
will crucially depend on the status of the customer. This again fundamentally differs 
                                                 
10  These obligations may be more onerous on businesses than the current obligations on domestic sales, 
both to reassure the Member State that the reverse-charge system is not leading to domestic tax losses, 
and to assure those neighbouring Member States which are concerned about their losses as a result of 
the reverse charge.  
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from the current system, where — with the exception of certain goods and services 
— it is generally the properties of the goods or services supplied which dictate the 
VAT treatment of a transaction. In addition, a threshold would add a further 
complication to the measure. There would be, in effect, taxable persons who fall 
under the reverse-charge measure, taxable persons who do not fall under the reverse-
charge measure because the supply is under the threshold, non-taxable persons, and 
in certain circumstances (where a supply is received for both taxable and non-taxable 
purposes) taxable persons who may fall under the reverse-charge measure for certain 
supplies, but not for others. All of these elements would need to be taken into 
account when the supplier is deciding whether or not to apply the reverse charge, and 
both businesses and Member States would need certainty as to these categories and 
when they apply. 
These are only a few of the inevitable new rules that would need to be created and 
that will place in question some of the principles that have governed VAT 
harmonisation so far. For example, the content of reporting obligations — apart from 
minimum requirements — has been largely left to Member States as they have the 
responsibility to correctly and efficiently manage the VAT system. Where the 
viability of the reverse-charge system will, however, depend on the level of reporting 
requirements and verification possibilities — as those replace the self-policing set of 
payment and deduction — there will be a need to set such details at EU level. Again, 
this expressly contradicts the direction of developments of the VAT system, which 
has been driving towards easing trade in the EU and reducing the burdens on 
businesses. 
The reverse charge would furthermore call for a number of specific rules across the 
tax system: an example may relate to the invoicing rules that would need to take into 
account such a new system. In addition, the impacts of specific schemes would have 
to be re-worked. For example, how would the reverse charge interact with the flat-
rate scheme for farmers, or the margin schemes for second-hand goods or travel 
agents? An answer may be to exclude these schemes from the reverse charge, but 
again this would lead to an increasing level of disparity, another subset of businesses 
to which the wide reverse charge would not apply. 
A wide reverse charge will lead to a shift in the way tax administrations administer 
and collect their tax, as they would concentrate their resources and efforts on where 
they see the most threat to their own revenue, that of the final stage. This may lead to 
less coherent auditing of the manufacture and wholesale stage, where VAT would no 
longer be collected and recorded. So, conversely, there would be a situation with the 
manufacture and wholesale stages being required to implement more stringent 
reporting and invoicing requirements, whilst at the same time the auditing and 
monitoring of these very businesses would decline. 
Further to these considerations would be added some of the more practical aspects of 
applying the measures, such as the taxable person’s responsibility to ascertain the 
correct liability. At present, it is the supplier who bears the responsibility of applying 
the correct VAT rate to the transaction. Under the wide reverse charge, this 
responsibility is shifted to the purchaser, who may not have such an accurate picture 
of the liability of his purchases (e.g. the correct application of VAT rates). In 
addition, there would be issues for a tax administration in distinguishing what is an 
exempt supply and what falls under the reverse charge, and the interaction of current  
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Article 395 derogations with that of the wide reverse charge. For example, a Member 
State may have a derogation for a reverse charge for a particular commodity, which 
is applied without a threshold. If a wide reverse charge with a threshold is 
introduced, how would this interact with existing reverse charges? It is entirely 
feasible that both were implemented for entirely different reasons, and so may not be 
practical to simply replace one with the other — a number of Member States apply a 
reverse charge to supplies of waste for example, and this is intended to combat fraud 
of a different nature to that which a wide reverse charge is intended to eliminate. In 
addition, Member States may need to re-evaluate their respective SME schemes, as, 
depending on the Member State, small businesses may play a greater role in the 
collection of the tax. 
These modifications may nevertheless be considered to be of a rather technical 
nature, and if the political will is present for such a radical change to the VAT system 
it would be difficult to argue that an EU-wide VAT system based on a generalised 
reverse charge is as such incompatible with the objectives of harmonisation as 
stipulated by Article 93 of the Treaty. 
On the other hand, the Commission cannot neglect its responsibility to maintain a tax 
in a format that also fulfils its revenue-raising function and it cannot be overlooked 
that VAT produces, in all Member States, some of the highest revenue levels of all 
taxes. A change in the system cannot be proposed as long as there is the remotest 
doubt as to the reliability of the new system and as to its fraud proofing. 
3.4.3.  Reverse charge as an obligation for Member States 
So far, only certain Member States have shown an interest in using a wide reverse-
charge mechanism to tackle fraud, and, accordingly, ECOFIN only considered its 
availability for Member States on an optional basis. This raises the fundamental 
question whether a voluntary system can still be considered to be compatible with the 
aim of harmonisation as explained above, and whether it threatens the coherence of 
the VAT system. 
As pointed out in the previous sections, the differences between the system based on 
fractionated payments and a reverse-charge system are of a fundamental nature and 
would entail numerous changes to the overall rules of VAT. To say it clearly: to 
allow for an optional reverse charge applicable in some Member States and not 
in others would mean the creation of a double VAT system. 
EU legislation is currently drafted and developed with a common framework in 
mind. A European Community with two VAT systems would necessitate 
consideration of both these systems when drafting and discussing legislation. It 
would be extremely difficult to add further developments to such a dual system in 
order to match the evolving internal market. Such a biased system would put at 
major risk the future development of VAT in the European Union as the 
interests of Member States in improving the VAT system would differ depending on 
the system they apply. 
For example, the future development of work on subjects such as the One-Stop 
Scheme, on VAT obligations or to some extent on vouchers would all be 
significantly complicated by the implementation of an optional wide reverse charge.  
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Much more consideration would be required at every level on how these changes 
would interact — for instance, how is a traditional single-purpose face-value voucher 
to be treated if purchased in a Member State operating under the traditional VAT 
system yet redeemed by a business in a Member State operating the reverse charge? 
While this problem could be addressed by appropriate definitions, it still highlights 
what would be a recurrent issue when developing new legislation. Or under a maxi 
One-Stop Scheme, would different systems be required for those Member States 
operating the reverse charge? 
Additionally, due to the elimination of the fractionated system, VAT obligations will 
be fundamentally different in Member States operating the wide reverse charge, and 
so these Member States would have entirely different priorities when discussing 
future amendments to these obligations. Indeed, under an optional wide reverse 
charge, the effects of any proposed legislation on both the traditional VAT system 
and the wide reverse charge would need to be considered when any such measures 
are discussed — a process and complication which would seriously compromise the 
decision-making abilities of the EU on VAT matters and fundamentally 
threaten the coherence of the VAT system. 
This is in addition to the practical difficulties arising from having two separate 
systems. Primarily, certain sectors (such as construction) and pan-European 
businesses would be required to implement mirror accounting systems which operate 
both the traditional VAT system alongside a system to deal with those Member 
States which have implemented a wide reverse charge. This extra cost and dual 
system may also lead to a decline in the attractiveness of the EU as a marketplace for 
international trade. 
Added to this would be an increase in the general level of business uncertainty within 
the EU. Should those Member States which have implemented a wide reverse charge 
be able to demonstrate to others that the system is a success, there may be increased 
pressure on the Governments of those Member States operating the traditional 
system to introduce the reverse charge themselves, leading to increased uncertainty 
amongst the business community. 
3.4.4.  Conclusion 
A fundamental change to the VAT system on an optional basis would have a 
significant detrimental effect on the coherence and harmonisation of the EU 
system as a whole. Not least in that it would represent a step away from the 
coherence and harmonisation which benefits the European Union as a whole. It also 
opens up a number of difficulties in terms of its practical application, its apparent 
conflict with common EU objectives, and the application of future legislation. 
The Commission accordingly has to take the view that it does not appear to be 
possible to have two VAT systems working contemporaneously. Either Member 
States should operate a classical VAT system or all Member States should operate 
the reverse charge. Any other solution would not respect the concept of a common 
VAT system and would not respect the wording and the spirit of Article 93 of the 
Treaty.  
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It is also recalled that the Commission and Member States are committed to reducing 
the burdens on businesses by 25% by 2012
11. To that extent, the general direction of 
current and future legislative proposals seeks to reduce the burdens on business, or at 
the very least not to significantly increase these burdens. As the largely self-
regulating nature of the VAT system will be eliminated under the reverse charge, 
more reporting requirements will be necessary in order to check its correct operation. 
This would be in direct conflict with the general reduction of burdens in Member 
States without the reverse charge. The European Community may then be in a 
situation in which it faces two-tier legislation, one which seeks to make trade easier 
for businesses and applies under the traditional system and the other which pulls in 
the opposite direction and applies to businesses operating in Member States 
implementing the reverse charge. 
3.5.  Conclusions on reverse charge 
The Commission has to admit that it can neither be demonstrated that a reverse 
charge would be a perfect proportional solution to the problems caused by MTIC 
fraud nor can it be shown that reverse charge would not be an appropriate solution. 
This is due to the fact that such a radical and far-reaching change in the system has 
not yet been undertaken anywhere in the world and no concrete results are therefore 
available. It is for this reason that the Commission does not oppose the idea of 
running a pilot project which could be set up with strict criteria and conditions to 
take into account the results of the analysis to date and involve oversight by both the 
Commission and the Member States. 
4.  PILOT PROJECT 
4.1.  Introduction 
The June 2007 ECOFIN Council expressed the wish to explore the potential effects 
of an optional reverse-charge mechanism by means of running a pilot scheme for a 
limited period of time in an interested Member State. This scheme would be open to 
any Member State. 
Such a pilot project would legally have to be based on an amendment to the VAT 
Directive. 
There are no results from the analysis carried out above that would indicate that the 
pilot should not take place. Nevertheless, the Commission would underline that in 
accordance with the preceding analysis, the pilot project would be undertaken with a 
view to establishing whether or not reverse charge as a concept can be proved to be 
successful and could be introduced on a mandatory basis at EU level so as to avoid 
a conflict with Article 93 of the Treaty and the compatibility of a harmonised VAT 
system with the wider objectives of the Treaty. It could not be envisaged that a 
successful pilot project would result in allowing Member States to introduce 
reverse charge on an optional basis. 
                                                 
11  Action Programme for Reducing Administrative Burdens in the European Union (COM(2007) 23) as 
endorsed by the Spring Council of 2007.  
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4.2.  Fundamentals 
By definition a pilot project needs to be limited in time. On the other hand, it needs 
to run for a sufficiently long period to demonstrate its robustness and efficiency as 
well as its capacity to be fraud-proof. As its results could only be evaluated on the 
basis of statistical evidence that would only be available after a certain time lag, and 
given that there are major costs of change for businesses
12 and the tax administration 
concerned, a period of five years looks to be a minimum. 
It would also be necessary to fix the evaluation criteria before the start of the project, 
and in particular to establish a methodology for measuring any reduction of tax fraud 
in general and MTIC fraud in particular. This would require a detailed ex ante 
assessment of the current situation in the volunteering Member State. 
Moreover, the pilot would need to be continuously monitored as to its effects in order 
both to protect the Member State applying it against adverse consequences and to 
prevent negative effects for other Member States. It is suggested to create an ad hoc 
steering group that includes the Member State applying the system, its immediate 
neighbouring countries and the Commission. 
Obviously, the Member State may suggest ending the pilot, but this should be 
formalised by a Council Decision after having heard the opinion of the steering 
group. 
Details of the pilot scheme should be discussed with the Member States in the 
Commission’s Working Party No 1. The debate should, in particular, focus on the 
following topics: 
•  Establishment of the evaluation criteria. 
•  Agreement on the methodology for establishing the results. 
•  Control measures which would be put in place in combination with the special 
reporting obligations to ensure correct application and to reduce, to the extent 
possible, new forms of fraud. 
•  How to organise feedback from industry affected by the measure. 
4.3.  Description of the system 
Based  inter alia on its contacts with the only Member State which has so far 
expressed an interest in acting as a pilot Member State, the Commission would see a 
potential system along the lines of the following principles: 
•  Application of a mandatory reverse-charge system, which makes the recipient 
liable for the payment of the VAT instead of the supplier, for domestic supplies of 
                                                 
12  A recent Austrian study (commissioned by the Chamber of Commerce Vienna with the Austrian 
Institute for SME Research) estimated that the initial costs for small and medium-sized businesses to 
implement a pilot project would be in the order of €12 750 to €20 000 and the annual recurring cost 
would be between €6 050 and €9 000.  
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goods and services between taxable persons as from a taxable amount per invoice 
of €5 000 or more. Particular measures might be needed to avoid a single supply 
being split up over different invoices to remain under the threshold. 
•  The system would be based on verification of the validity of the VAT 
identification number of the purchaser. Additional measures for verifying the 
status of the purchaser as a taxable person might have to be imposed if the 
payment is settled by other means than via a bank account in the European Union. 
•  If this verification were correctly carried out by the supplier and the taxable status 
of the recipient were confirmed, solely the recipient would be liable for the 
payment of the VAT and for potential misuse of the VAT number (e.g. use for 
non-business purposes). 
•  In order to have a clear overview of the supplies under the reverse-charge system, 
special obligations will be necessary. This could take the form of a (monthly) 
listing by the supplier and the recipient. 
•  Special measures will have to be decided if the new generalised reverse-charge 
mechanism were to coincide with other existing situations of reverse charge. 
4.4.  Conditions which would have to be fulfilled by a volunteering Member State 
The Commission would propose that the following should be the criteria for the 
acceptance of a Member State to carry out the pilot project: 
(1)  The volunteering Member State would have to be a “small” Member State 
with not more than one million taxable persons. 
(2)  The Member State should be able to demonstrate the size of the fraud 
problem that it is experiencing by means of a reliable methodology. It should 
also indicate the amount of additional VAT revenue which it expects to 
receive as a result of changing to reverse charge. 
(3)  An impact assessment would have to be done by the interested Member State 
to establish whether the costs to businesses of implementing the measure 
were proportionate to the VAT expected to be saved. 
(4)  The Member State should explain the measures taken to tackle fraud and why 
the classical control methodology has not worked to fight fraud. 
(5)  The length of the pilot project should be strictly limited. However, the 
Commission believes that a period of less than three years would not be 
sufficient time to allow the experiment to be bedded down and therefore 
adequately evaluated. On the basis that a proper evaluation would take in the 
order of six months, and then sufficient time should be given to businesses to 
allow them to change back to the classical system if it appears that reverse 
charge does not meet its objectives, the Commission proposes that the period 
for the pilot should be five years, with evaluation to commence at the end of 
the fourth year.  
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(6)  The Member State volunteering as the pilot would not be able to revert back 
to the normal VAT arrangements before the end of the third year of the 
experiment. 
(7)  The volunteering Member State would supply the Commission with a 
detailed description of how it would propose to control businesses, including 
the additional human and financial resources which would be allocated to the 
control task. This information would not be published and would be classified 
as confidential. 
(8)  The Member State concerned would supply the Commission on a regular 
basis with the interim results of the experiment; particularly the evolution of 
VAT receipts and the size of the fraud problem. The Commission would keep 
the other Member States informed during information meetings under the 
auspices of Working Party No 1. During these meetings, the other Member 
States would report on any effects they had experienced. This could be 
regarding a possible spill-over effect of additional fraud arising from untaxed 
goods circulating on their markets as a result of the application of reverse 
charge in the volunteering Member State, or difficulties their taxable persons 
were experiencing in doing business in the Member State concerned, etc. 
(9)  The project evaluation would be carried out in the context of the work of 
Working Party No 1, and representatives of the businesses could be invited to 
give their experiences with operation of the system. 
(10)  The details of the obligations on taxable persons (listings, declarations, 
thresholds, obligations regarding the checking of the status of the customer) 
would be specified in the VAT Directive based on a proposal made by the 
Commission under Article 93 of the Treaty. The legislation would have a 
sunset clause. 
(11)  The volunteering Member State would be obliged to revert back to the 
classical VAT system at the end of the five-year test period.  
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5.  ANNEXES 
5.1.  EU trade balances 2005 and 2006 
  2005 2006 








AT  -10 092    -8 376   
BE   21  539  22  700 
BG  -2 283    -2 384   
CY  -2 649    -3 042   
CZ   3  636  5  035 
DE   98  946   103  087 
DK   5  227  2  996 
EE  -1 427    -2 852   
EL  -16 655    -18 363   
ES  -36 898    -37 406   
FI -1  396      122 
FR  -37 210    -38 664   
HU   3  537  4  105 
IE   19  479  16  691 
IT -186    -738   
LT  -1 202    -2 481   
LU  749   1  410 
LV  -2 087    -3 459   
MT  -1 226    -1 076   
NL   116  108  127  332 
PL  -5 019    -3 608    
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PT  -13 130    -13 432   
RO  -4 915    -7 647   
SI  -2 435    -2 247   
SK  197   1  216 
SV -1  609      222 
UK  -55 212    -57 459   
     
Totals  -195 631  269 418  -203 234  284 916  
EN  52     EN 
5.2.  Details on submission of VAT returns and recapitulative statements 
Number of taxpayers 
submitting returns 





















2 604 362  9% of all taxpayers 
 